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TAX’S DIGITAL LABOR DILEMMA
AMANDA PARSONS†
ABSTRACT
Digitalization has reshaped the relationship between companies and
their customers and users. Customers and users increasingly serve a
dual role. They are not only consumers but also producers, creating
data and content. They are a value-creating workforce, functioning as
“digital laborers.”
Digital laborers’ value creation highlights that there are two parts to
the question of whether multinational companies are paying their “fair
share” of taxes—one of amount and one of location. First, are
companies’ total tax bills paid across all countries in line with their
global income? Second, is taxing authority over multinational
companies’ income being divided amongst countries in a coherent and
fair way? Digital laborers’ value creation implicates the second. Under
the current international tax system, the presence of digital laborers in
a country does not grant that country taxing rights over income
stemming directly from those digital laborers’ data and content
creation. As a result, what are essentially the same activities—
individuals creating products and performing services for a company—
are taxed differently when they are performed by digital laborers rather
than by a traditional workforce. This inconsistency and the
accompanying outcome that countries cannot tax corporate income
arising from extensive business activities within their borders have
contributed to cries that the current system is unfair.
Recent reforms addressing this outcome share a common weakness.
They do not recognize the function of digital laborers as producers in
the modern economy. As a result, they overturn the theory of sourcebased taxation as a taxing right granted only to the country of
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production and introduce major structural changes to the international
tax system that apply only to a subset of global companies. These
changes are all to correct an unfairness that can be remedied under the
system’s current theoretical framework and structure.
This Article rejects the notion that these major theoretical and
structural changes are necessary or even appropriate methods to allow
digital laborers’ home countries to tax income directly related to their
data and content creation. Instead, the international tax system should
recognize digital laborers’ role as a new type of workforce for
companies and, accordingly, allow their home countries to tax income
related to their work under the existing application of the source
principle and with more incremental structural reforms. In addition to
minimizing disruption in international tax law, this approach
reinforces coherence and fairness by taxing equivalent economic
activities equivalently.
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INTRODUCTION
Digital laborers are a fixture of our increasingly digitalized global
economy. Digital laborers are users and customers who create data and
content for companies, serving a dual role as both producers and
consumers. The phenomenon of digital labor highlights that when we
ask whether multinational companies are paying their “fair share” of
taxes in the modern economy, we are asking two questions. The first,
and perhaps more familiar, is if multinational companies are paying
taxes at all. Have multinational companies been able to manipulate
weaknesses in international tax law to achieve a low or even
nonexistent tax bill?1 But a second and equally important question is
where these companies are paying taxes. Is taxing authority being
divided amongst countries in a coherent and fair way?2 Digital
laborers’ data and content creation implicate this second question.
Under the current application of the international tax system, digital
laborers’ home countries are not granted taxing authority over income
stemming directly from their production, and this outcome has been
identified as unfair.3
The international tax system should recognize that digital laborers
serve a similar function as a traditional workforce does and treat them
as such for purposes of allocating taxing authority over income directly
attributable to their production amongst jurisdictions. Doing so brings

1. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, No Federal Taxes for Dozens of Big, Profitable Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/business/economy/zero-corporate-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/FH2A-YYEC] (last updated Oct. 7, 2021) (reporting that at least fifty-five
Fortune 500 companies did not pay federal income taxes in 2020). For further discussion, see infra
notes 55–59 and accompanying text (outlining criticisms of the international tax system, claims
that multinational companies are not paying their “fair share” of taxes, and the rise of “stateless”
and “homeless” corporate income).
2. See infra notes 55, 58 and accompanying text (identifying incoherence in the place where
income is taxed under the current international tax system).
3. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for this outcome
and identifying criticisms of its unfairness).
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consistency to international tax law by taxing equivalent economic
activities—individuals producing goods and performing services for a
company—in the same way. Treating digital laborers in the same way
as a traditional workforce grants taxing authority to digital laborers’
home countries under the current theoretical framework of
international tax law and requires more incremental structural changes
than those proposed by other reforms.
The story of Facebook4 illustrates the central role of digital
laborers’ production in the digital economy.5 Each day one-fifth of the
world’s population logs onto Facebook, and one-third of the world’s

4. This Article uses “Facebook” to refer to both the parent company now known as Meta
Platforms, Inc., and the digital platform known as Facebook.
5. There is no universally agreed upon definition of the “digital economy.” See, e.g., IMF,
MEASURING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 7 (2018), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/PolicyPapers/Issues/2018%20/04/03/022818-measuring-the-digital-economy [https://perma.cc/K3Q2-ZPZA]
(“There are no agreed definitions of digital sector, products or transactions, let alone the digital
economy.”); Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV.
145, 150–51 (2019) (explaining that there is no clear definition of the digital economy).
The digital economy is often defined broadly. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), for example, has recently defined the digital economy
as “all economic activity reliant on, or significantly enhanced by the use of digital inputs, including
digital technologies, digital infrastructure, digital services and data. . . . [and] all producers and
consumers, including government, that are utilising these digital inputs in their economic
activities.” OECD, A ROADMAP TOWARD A COMMON FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 5 (2020) [hereinafter OECD, MEASURING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY], https://
www.oecd.org/sti/roadmap-toward-a-common-framework-for-measuring-the-digital-economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H24L-EMBQ]; see also SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45532, DIGITAL
SERVICES TAXES (DSTS): POLICY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (2019) (defining the digital
economy as including all economic activities that occur via mobile devices or devices connected
to the internet).
There are certain features of the digital economy that are most relevant to the analysis of
the work of customers and users. The first is the centrality of information and data within the
digital economy. See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 16, 47 (2019) (defining the informational
economy as “one oriented principally toward the production, accumulation, and processing of
information” and identifying data as the “fourth factor of production” within the informational
economy). The work of customers is very often the key source of data production for companies.
The second is the importance of platform-based business models within the digital economy.
Platform-based business models are important to this analysis because they are the mechanism
through which the work of content creation (and accompanying data creation) is accomplished.
See generally GEOFFREY G. PARKER, MARSHALL W. VAN ALSTYNE & SANGEET PAUL
CHOUDARY, PLATFORM REVOLUTION: HOW NETWORKED MARKETS ARE TRANSFORMING
THE ECONOMY—AND HOW TO MAKE THEM WORK FOR YOU (2016) (documenting the rise of
the platform economy). References to “digitalization” and the “digital economy” in this Article
will, therefore, most commonly be linked to the data economy and the platform economy.
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population uses the platform each month.6 The social media giant’s
attraction of nearly 1.9 billion daily users and 2.9 billion monthly users
is staggering—60 percent of all people with internet access are active
users of the website.7 And Facebook’s reach is truly global—90 percent
of its daily users are located in countries other than the United States
and Canada.8
Facebook’s success relies on this global army of users producing
masses of content, as well as data. Users upload more than three
hundred million photos to the platform each day.9 Each minute, users
post nearly three hundred thousand status updates and five hundred
thousand comments.10 And, even more importantly, Facebook’s
billions of users produce valuable data both through their content
creation and through their navigation of the platform—four petabytes
(four million gigabytes) of data each day as of 2019.11 Facebook
monetizes this data and content in a variety of ways.12 Leveraging the
work of its users, Facebook has grown since its 2004 founding to a
company with $86 billion in annual revenue.13

6. In the first quarter of 2021, Facebook estimated that it had 1.878 billion daily active users
and 2.853 billion monthly active users. FACEBOOK, FB EARNINGS PRESENTATION Q1 2021 2–3
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2021/FB-Earnings-Present
ation-Q1-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8RT-9W3D].
7. See Statistics, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R6AC-UFQK] (estimating that 4.6 billion people across the globe had access to
internet at the end of 2020).
8. Forty percent of its daily users are located in the Asia-Pacific region, 16 percent are
located in Europe, 10 percent are located in the United States and Canada, and the remaining 34
percent are located across the rest of the world. FACEBOOK, supra note 6, at 2. The geographic
distribution of monthly users is substantially similar. Id. at 3.
9. Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats
Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-every
one-should-read [https://perma.cc/D5ES-FKBL].
10. Id.
11. Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f
[https://perma.cc/44XM-U9Y5].
12. How firms monetize customer-generated content and data is outlined in Part II.C below.
13. See Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11, 66 (Jan. 27, 2021) [hereinafter
Facebook 2020 Form 10-K].
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Facebook’s business model reflects this new hybrid relationship
between customers14 and an enterprise.15 In business models employed
before the rise of the digital economy, as well as in lines of business less
impacted by digitalization today, the relationship between customers
and an enterprise is separate and more clearly defined. The enterprise
produces products and services, which customers then purchase with
money. In contrast, Facebook’s users both consume the company’s
products and services and contribute to their production.
Facebook and other social media platforms are not the only
enterprises that both have this type of hybrid relationship with
customers and leverage their labor. The digital economy is growing
rapidly.16 This growth includes the rise of platform business models,
such as online marketplaces, review sites, and media hosting platforms,
where the work of content creation by digital laborers is prominent.
The data economy is also a key component to the digital economy.
Digital laborers create vast quantities of data for platform businesses
through their content creation and other activities on the platforms,
and these companies are at present most attuned to the value of this
data and how to monetize it.17 However, digital technologies have
enabled companies to collect data on their customers across a variety
of industries, causing one commentator to note that “for most
companies, their data is their single biggest asset.”18 As other industries
begin to recognize the value of customer data, the work of digital
14. This Article employs the term “users” when discussing specific businesses or categories
of businesses, such as social media companies, that refer to their patrons as “users.” When not
referring to these specific businesses and business models, it employs the more generic term
“customers.”
15. This Article uses the terms “company,” “firm,” and “enterprise” interchangeably to
refer to business entities generally—both entities that are taxed directly and entities that pass the
tax burden through to their owners. The conclusions of this Article apply to both non-passthrough and pass-through entities. The term “corporation” is used to refer to an entity that is
taxed under U.S. federal income tax law as a corporation as that term is defined in I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(3).
16. See OECD, MEASURING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 5, at 11.
17. See, e.g., MIT TECH. REV. CUSTOM & ORACLE, THE RISE OF DATA CAPITAL 4 (2016),
http://files.technologyreview.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+Report-The_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39BS-RW9S] (“Google, Amazon, Netflix, and Uber have all realized that data is
more than just a record of something that happened. Data is raw material for creating new kinds
of value . . . .”); THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., THE VALUE OF OUR DIGITAL IDENTITY 9 (2012)
(highlighting that internet sectors, as well as the retail sector, are most advanced in their use of
personal data).
18. MIT TECH. REV. CUSTOM & ORACLE, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting financial economist
Andrew W. Lo).
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laborers will become an even more important feature of the economy
overall.
The rising importance of digital laborers in the economy and the
data and content they create has sparked a lively and growing debate
across various areas of the law as well as other disciplines. For example,
the widespread creation and collection of digital laborers’ data have
provoked concerns about the sufficiency of data governance and
privacy laws,19 as well as about the impact of big data on antitrust law.20
Concerns over the equitable division of the wealth created by digital
laborers’ data have led to calls for digital laborers to be compensated
for their work,21 as well as to broader discussions on the exploitative
nature of data collection.22 And a crucial conversation has emerged
exploring the changes (and threats) that the rise of informational
capitalism, of which digital labor is a vital component, has brought
about in our legal system at a fundamental level.23 Although focused

19. See generally, e.g., Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data Governance, 131 YALE
L.J. 573 (2021) (identifying the population-level harms of datafication and the inadequacy of
individualistic approach to data governance law to address these harms); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF,
THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW
FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (outlining in detail the business practices of surveillance and data
collection as well as their harms, and arguing that current privacy and antitrust laws are
insufficient to prevent these harms); Alexander Tsesis, Data Subjects’ Privacy Rights: Regulation
of Personal Data Retention and Erasure, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 593 (2019) (contrasting the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation with the libertarian conceptions of the
internet prevalent in the United States); Laura DeNardis & Mark Raymond, The Internet of
Things as a Global Policy Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475, 482 (2017) (outlining privacy
concerns related to data gathering on users within the Internet of Things (“IoT”)).
20. See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND
COMPETITION POLICY (2016) (discussing the competitive implications of big data and the practice
of data-driven mergers).
21. See, e.g., JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 15–17 (2013) (arguing that
individuals should be proportionally compensated for their creation and contribution of data);
ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 209 (2018) (arguing that enterprises should be required to
compensate individuals for their electronic data).
22. See infra note 126 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of concerns
about the exploitation of digital laborers within the field of political economy.
23. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 5, at 15 (tracing how the information economy has resulted
in the development of private power and analyzing how the law has both facilitated and been
shaped by these developments); Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129
YALE L.J. 1460, 1460 (2020) (arguing that informational capitalism threatens equality and selfgovernance); Katharina Pistor, Rule By Data: The End of Markets?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
101, 101 (2020) (exploring the idea that data may become a form of governance replacing both
law and markets).
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on international tax law, this Article’s observations and conclusions
inform some of these crucial debates in multiple fields.24
The rising importance of digital laborers has critical implications
for the taxation of the firms for whom they work. The work of digital
laborers has been discussed in tax academia and policy as part of
conversations on the broader crisis of multinational companies,
particularly digital companies, being able to conduct substantial
economic activities in countries without paying taxes there.25 In
particular, commentators have highlighted the value that users of
digital platforms create for digital companies, the inability of users’
countries to tax these companies despite this value creation, and the
unfairness of this outcome.26 This outcome stems from the current
application of the source principle to digital laborers.
The source principle grants taxing authority to the country that is
the location of production of goods and services, not the location of
consumption.27 The mere presence of consumers in a jurisdiction does
not grant that jurisdiction taxing authority under the source principle.
The current international tax system treats users and customers who
create data and content for companies as consumers only—their
production role as digital laborers is ignored. Their home countries,
therefore, are not able to tax income directly stemming from their data
and content creation under the current application of the source
principle.28
Two categories of reform have been put forward to correct this
unfairness—proposals that grant taxing rights over a portion of a
company’s residual profits to the market jurisdiction, culminating in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) Pillar One Blueprint, and digital services taxes that have
been unilaterally imposed by several countries.29 These reforms
represent an upheaval of the current theoretical approach to sourcebased taxation, granting taxing authority to the market jurisdiction. As
24. For further discussion of the development and analysis of the concept of digital labor in
legal scholarship and other disciplines, see infra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
25. See Part I.B for a more detailed discussion of these debates.
26. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
27. See Part I.A for an explanation of the source principle as a production-based concept.
28. See Part I.B for an explanation of the current international tax system’s application of
the source principle to income stemming from digital labor.
29. For a more detailed description of these reforms, see infra notes 80–96 and
accompanying text.
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is discussed in more detail in Part I.C below, they include substantial
overhauls to the structure of the international tax system.30 And they
do not represent comprehensive reforms of the taxation of all global
businesses. The OECD Pillar One Blueprint applies only to the top one
hundred multinational companies based on profitability and revenue
measures.31
Digital services tax proposals likewise apply only to multinational
companies that surpass high revenue thresholds.32 As a result, these
reforms do not address the fair allocation of taxing authority over a
substantial amount of global economic activity. This Article argues that
these reforms share a common flaw. They do not recognize the
production role that digital laborers play in the modern economy. As a
result, they unnecessarily alter the international tax system from both
a theoretical and structural perspective and allow the incongruent
result of similar economic activities being taxed differently to remain.
This Article establishes that users and customers, in their
production role as digital laborers, serve a similar economic function
to a traditional workforce. It argues that, as a result, digital laborers
should be treated in the same way as a company’s workforce when
considering the tax implications of their work for the sourcing of such
company’s income. This approach of treating digital laborers in the
same way as a traditional workforce brings coherence and fairness to
the international tax system by taxing equivalent economic activities—
individuals creating products and performing services for companies—
in the same way. It then demonstrates that under U.S. international tax
law, once digital laborers are properly treated in the same way as a
company’s workforce, their home countries should be the source
countries for income attributable to their work in most instances. After
these countries are established as the source country, they can be
granted taxing authority through a more incremental rebalancing of
taxing rights between the source and residence countries under the
bilateral treaty system. This approach corrects the unfairness of digital
laborers’ home countries being unable to tax income attributable to
their work while minimizing theoretical and structural disruption to the
international tax system. Because this approach operates under the

30. See infra notes 102–10 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (describing the design of the OECD Pillar
One Blueprint).
32. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (describing the design of the digital services
taxes of various countries).
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current international tax structure, it can be applied uniformly across
all global businesses.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the general
principles and structure of the current international tax system and the
challenges brought about by digitalization. It introduces and critiques
proposed reforms and offers an alternative path forward. Part II
reveals how digital laborers function in a similar way to members of
firms’ workforces, as well as how firms monetize this work. It also
discusses the unique features of digital labor. Part III applies this new
framework of digital laborers as a type of workforce to the U.S.
statutory rules for sourcing income between the United States and
foreign jurisdictions, as well as to the U.S. bilateral treaty network. It
demonstrates how allocating income associated with digital laborers’
work to their home countries is consistent with existing U.S. statutory
rules and provides a guide for stakeholders to incorporate this
framework in the context of bilateral tax treaties. Part IV addresses
general issues of administrability and implementation.
I. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
ECONOMY
This Part begins by outlining the basic structure and underlying
theory of the international tax system. It then explains how the rise of
the digital economy has challenged the international tax system and
describes different approaches to reform, focusing in particular on two
types of reform intended to address the appropriate taxation of value
creation by users and customers—the OECD Pillar One Blueprint and
digital services taxes. It then describes the weaknesses of the OECD
Pillar One Blueprint and digital services taxes. It concludes with a call
for a different approach to reform—treating digital laborers in the
same way as a traditional workforce when allocating taxing authority
amongst jurisdictions.
A. Structure and Principles of International Taxation—Source and
Residence
More than one hundred years ago, following the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, Congress imposed a tax on income
“derived from any source whatever.”33 Since this time, policymakers
33.

Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.B., 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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have grappled with the question of how to tax international
commerce.34 What happens when a French citizen or resident earns
income in the United States, or when a U.S. citizen or resident earns
income in France? Both the United States and France arguably have
claims to tax that income. U.S. international tax law answers this
question through the interplay between a complex statutory scheme
primarily contained in subchapter N of the Internal Revenue Code
(“the Code”)35 and a series of bilateral treaties between the United
States and various foreign jurisdictions.36
Under the theoretical framework that has dominated
international taxation since its inception, taxing authority can be
granted to a country under one of two principles—the residence
principle or the source principle.37 The residence principle grants
34. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX. REV. 313, 315–17 (2005) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Four Ages]
(outlining changes in international tax law from the Revenue Act of 1918 through the George W.
Bush administration and highlighting common themes that have driven policymakers in these
revisions, such as avoidance of double taxation).
35. I.R.C. §§ 861–1000.
36. This summary of U.S. international taxation is an extremely brief simplification of an
extremely complex area of tax law. For a robust guide, see generally JOEL KUNTZ & ROBERT
PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2021).
This Article contains references to the “U.S. international tax system” and the
“international tax system” as well as to “U.S. international tax law” and “international tax law.”
The international tax system is created by a combination of (1) the domestic laws of individual
countries regarding the taxation of foreign persons and foreign-source income and (2) vast
numbers of bilateral treaties between countries. Ruth Mason, The Transformation of
International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353, 355 (2020). While the exact contours of each country’s
domestic law and bilateral treaties may vary, they all follow the same basic structure and norms,
creating a coherent international tax system and body of international tax law. See REUVEN S.
AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2007) (explaining the driving
norms that underlay international tax law); Mason, supra, at 374–75 (describing this uniformity
amongst domestic tax laws and bilateral treaties as a form of “coordinated unilateralism”). This
Article uses the specific domestic tax laws of the United States and the U.S. bilateral treaty
network as the basis for its analysis, but, because of its uniformity, the conclusions apply to the
international tax system as a whole. When used in this Article, the terms “U.S. international tax
law” and the “U.S. international tax system” refer specifically to U.S. domestic tax law and
bilateral treaties. The terms “international tax law” or the “international tax system” refer to the
basic structure and principles followed by all countries.
37. See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 429, 431 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the common conceptual framework
in international tax for allocation of taxing authority amongst jurisdictions as based on the
concepts of (1) personal connection to the jurisdiction, which is primarily determined by residence
and (2) the jurisdiction being the “source” of income); Mason, supra note 36, at 355 (“The current
international tax system . . . relies on the concepts of source and residence.”); Michael J. Graetz
& Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021,
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taxing rights to the taxpayer’s residence country,38 and the source
principle grants taxing rights to the country that is the locus of the
economic activities that give rise to income.39 The source principle is
based on the place of production, the supply side. The mere presence
of consumers in a country, the demand side, does not make it a locus
of economic activities under the source principle and does not result in
it being granted taxing rights.40 The market jurisdiction, therefore, is
not granted taxing rights under the existing theoretical framework of
international tax. The source principle is justified under the benefits

1033 (1997) (identifying the investor’s residence country and the country that is the source of
income creation as the two jurisdictions with “legitimate claims to tax [cross-border] income”);
see also AVI-YONAH, supra note 36, at 22 (linking the justification for jurisdiction to tax based on
residence and source to the “grounds of jurisdiction to prescribe in international law” based on
nationality and territoriality).
38. Within the international tax system, whether a country can tax on the basis of residence
is determined by reference to domestic law. See OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL art. 4, ¶ 1 (2017) [hereinafter OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION] (defining
“resident of a Contracting State” as “any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax
therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of similar
nature”). For individuals, “residence-based” taxation may be asserted by a country based on
either physical presence within the country or citizenship. See KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36,
¶ B1.01 (explaining that the United States generally asserts taxing authority over the worldwide
income of both U.S. citizens and resident alien individuals); I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A), (3) (defining
resident aliens as including individuals who meet a substantial presence test). For corporations,
“residence-based” taxation is typically asserted by countries based on the corporation’s place of
incorporation or place of management. See Mason, supra note 36, at 355 (explaining that
corporate tax residence is typically determined based on either place of incorporation or place of
management or control).
39. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32
YALE J. ON REGUL. 311, 313 (2015); AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 37, at 429, 431; Graetz &
O’Hear, supra note 37, at 1033.
40. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 863(b) (sourcing inventory property produced by taxpayer to the place
of production); I.R.C. § 861(a)(3) (sourcing income from services to the place of performance);
OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 38, at arts. 5, 7 (allowing a jurisdiction to tax
business profits only in the instance that the business has an office, factory, or other fixed place
of business through which they conduct business); see also OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION—REPORT ON PILLAR
ONE BLUEPRINT: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 11 (2020) [hereinafter OECD, PILLAR ONE
BLUEPRINT], https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/beba0634-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publi
cation/beba0634-en [https://perma.cc/3FAZ-GGD5] (framing the allocation of taxing authority
to the market jurisdiction as a creation of a “new taxing right”); Avi-Yonah, Four Ages, supra
note 34, at 320 (linking source-based taxation with the concept of “production of wealth”); Report
on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi,
Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, at 23, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923) (framing
source-based taxation as taxation by the jurisdiction that is the origin of wealth and describes such
jurisdiction as “the place where the wealth is produced” (emphasis added)).
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theory of taxation,41 which views taxes as compensation for benefits
that a government supplies (such as infrastructure and legal
protections) that facilitate production.42
The source principle plays a central role in the United States’
statutory approach to international taxation. An analysis of the
treatment of an item of income with international elements under U.S.
tax law begins by applying the U.S. source rules to the transaction.43
The source rules outline whether particular types of income are from
sources within the United States (U.S. source) or from sources without
the United States (foreign source).44 For example, if a French firm
earns income for providing services within the United States, the
source rules dictate that that income comes from sources within the
United States.45 These source rules express the United States’ view of
the location of production, the place from which gains from various

41. E.g., Kane, supra note 39, at 315 (concluding that “source-based taxation must
ultimately rest on some sort of benefits rationale” while acknowledging criticisms of the benefits
theory); Avi-Yonah, Four Ages, supra note 34, at 320 (explaining that benefits theory is used to
justify source-based taxation); Klaus Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation- A Review and ReEvaluation of Arguments (Part III), 16 INTERTAX 393, 398 (1988) (“The only valid legitimation
[for source-based taxation], therefore, can be derived from benefit aspects. Usually it is the state
of source that has provided most or all of the benefits relevant for production of the income.
Without this state’s economic opportunities the income normally would not have been
generated.”).
42. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax
Regime, 61 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 129, 135 (2007) (“[Government] benefits justify source-based
corporate taxation in the sense that the host country’s government bears some of the costs of
providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the income.”). The benefits theory has been
criticized by many scholars. See, e.g., Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of
the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 29 (1993) (arguing that sourcebased taxation is not compatible with underpinnings of international taxation because it does not
comport with the ability-to-pay principle); Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing
International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 30–32 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) (arguing that income
cannot be ascribed to a geographic location). Still, it has remained a central and enduring feature
of the international tax system since its inception. See, e.g., AVI-YONAH, supra note 36, at 1
(identifying the benefits principle as a basic underlying norm of the international tax system);
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 37, at 1027–28 (noting the emphasis on source-based taxation in the
initial development of the U.S. international tax system).
43. Sections 861–63 and 865 of the Code, along with accompanying Treasury regulations,
contain the source rules.
44. I.R.C. §§ 861–862.
45. I.R.C. § 861(a)–(b) (delineating items of gross and taxable income stemming from
sources within the United States); I.R.C. § 862(a)–(b) (delineating items of gross and taxable
income stemming from sources without the United States); I.R.C. § 865 (outlining what types of
sales of personal property produce U.S.-source versus foreign-source income).
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types of economic activities stem, and when a jurisdiction should be
given taxing authority under the source principle.
Both the source jurisdiction and the residence jurisdiction have
legitimate claims to tax income earned by the resident of one
jurisdiction through economic activity in the other jurisdiction. These
dual claims lead to the possibility of income being taxed twice.
Avoiding double taxation has been the central project of international
taxation.46 To avoid double taxation, the U.S. statutory scheme
interacts with a series of bilateral income tax treaties that the United
States has entered into with various nations.47 The United States
currently has about forty such bilateral income tax treaties in force.48
Although each treaty is individually negotiated and is unique, there is
standardization across the treaties. This standardization arises from the
United States’ reliance on model treaties—most notably the OECD
Model Tax Convention, which is widely followed by other countries—
in treaty negotiations.49 These treaties represent a bargain between the
claims of the source jurisdiction and the residence jurisdiction with
respect to certain items of income. They reflect whether the source
principle or the residence principle is given primacy when determining
the appropriate taxation of specific economic activities by taxpayers in
the party countries—a balancing of the taxing rights of the source and
residence jurisdictions.
B. The Failings of International Tax Law in the Modern Economy
and Proposed Reforms
The basic framework and structure of the international tax system
were established in the 1920s by members of the League of Nations
when they negotiated a series of model treaties aimed at preventing

46. As Michael Graetz and Michael O’Hear observe, “The basic task of international tax
rules is to resolve the competing claims of residence and source nations in order to avoid the
double taxation that results when both fully exercise their taxing power.” Graetz & O’Hear, supra
note 37, at 1033.
47. The treaties in some cases will alter the division of taxing rights between source and
residence jurisdictions that exists under each party’s domestic law. See I.R.C. § 894(a)(1) (“The
provisions of this title shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of
the United States which applies to such taxpayer.”).
48. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36, ¶ C4.02[1].
49. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 12 (explaining the influence that
the OECD Model Tax Convention has had since 1963 on the drafting of bilateral tax treaties both
by OECD member states and non-OECD member states).
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double taxation.50 This framework and structure have endured for
nearly a century with few modifications despite the economic changes
that have occurred in the intervening years.51
The structure of the international taxation system has been the
target of much criticism. Globalization, a trend that has continued to
the present,52 accelerated rapidly beginning in the 1990s with the fall of
the Soviet Union and proliferation of free trade agreements.53 At the
same time, the widespread adoption of the internet ignited the rise of
the digital economy.54 These changes in the economy have placed
pressure on the international tax system, exposing cracks and sparking
calls for broad reform.
Scholars and policymakers have highlighted that the current
international regime does not appropriately allocate tax revenues to
the jurisdictions in which firms are adding economic value,55 and, in

50. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996) (citing the League of Nations project in the
1920s as the foundation for the current international tax treaty system); Graetz & O’Hear, supra
note 37, at 1023 (explaining that “the fundamental structure for international taxation of income
announced . . . in the 1928 League of Nations Model Treaty forms the common basis for more
than twelve hundred bilateral tax treaties now in force throughout the world”). For a detailed
history of the League of Nations and the development of the international tax system in the 1920s,
see generally SUNITA JOGARAJAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2018).
51. Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 262–
63 (2001) (noting the limited changes to the system of international taxation since the “1920’s
compromise”).
52. See MCKINSEY & CO., A VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS 2–5
(2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial%20Services/Our%20
Insights/A%20vision%20for%20the%20future%20of%20cross%20border%20payments%20fin
al/A-vision-for-the-future-of-cross-border-payments-web-final.ashx [https://perma.cc/MG7U-6VE5]
(showing a steady increase in cross-border payments and predicting a continuation of that trend).
53. See Peter Vanham, A Brief History of Globalization, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/how-globalization-4-0-fits-into-the-history-of-globalization
[https://perma.cc/TA38-Y8JW] (describing the combination of these factors as resulting in
“globalization on steroids”).
54. See UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., DIGITAL ECONOMY REPORT 2019:
VALUE CREATION AND CAPTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–9 (2019),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2019_overview_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUD7ERMP] (providing an overview of the evolution of the digital economy beginning in the 1990s
and current trends).
55. Allison Christians, Digital Services Taxes and Internation Equity: A Tribute to Peggy
Musgrave, 95 TAX NOTES INT’L 589, 589 (2019) (discussing the interaction of the current debate
over which jurisdictions are entitled to tax a company’s economic gain and the concept of internation equity); Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate Tax
System Fit for the 21st Century?, 35 FISCAL STUD. 449, 461 (2014) (noting that the current
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many cases, it allows firms to earn income that is not taxed by any
jurisdiction, so-called “stateless income.”56 Professor Ruth Mason has
highlighted how this state of affairs has led international tax scholars
to supplement the goal of avoiding double taxation with the goal of
achieving “full taxation.”57 There is a broad belief that large global
enterprises generally—and, in particular, digital enterprises—are not
paying their fair share of tax both cumulatively and in the specific
countries in which they operate;58 the mantra of the need to pay a fair
share has become ubiquitous amongst politicians and in the popular
press.59
There are a variety of features of the current international tax
system that allow global companies to shift profits and avoid taxation;

international system of allocating tax rights amongst jurisdictions is “arbitrary” and “often
incoherent and unprincipled”). See generally Carol A. Dunahoo, Source Country Taxation of
Foreign Corporations: Evolving Permanent Establishment Concepts, 86 TAX MAG. 37 (2008)
(discussing the challenges that e-commerce has presented in appropriately allocating profits
among jurisdictions).
56. See generally, e.g., Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income:
Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535 (2012) (tracing the roots of stateless
income); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 703–05 (2011)
(discussing how source rules and the transfer pricing regime have contributed to ability of
multinational enterprises to create income that escapes tax in any jurisdiction). The OECD
reported that an estimated $100 billion to $240 billion in tax revenue is lost annually due to
shifting of income to no-tax or low-tax jurisdictions. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 16 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT].
57. Mason, supra note 36, at 370–73.
58. Faulhaber, supra note 5, at 152–53; Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Chapter 4:
Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate Tax Reform, in DIGITAL REVOLUTIONS
IN PUBLIC FINANCE 91, 92 (Sanjeev Gupta et al. eds., 2017).
59. See, e.g., Matt Egan, Elizabeth Warren: US Taxes Are Rigged in Favor of Amazon,
Netflix and Other Big Companies, CNN BUS. (last updated Apr. 27, 2021, 7:06 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/27/business/elizabeth-warren-amazon-netflix-taxes/index.html [https://
perma.cc/GEA3-NGC7] (quoting Senator Elizabeth Warren saying that small businesses were
paying their “fair share” of taxes while large corporations were not); Editorial, Make TaxDodging Companies Pay for Biden’s Infrastructure Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/opinion/sunday/biden-taxes-companies.html [https://perma.cc/BCZ62HJZ]; Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, Biden and Democrats Detail Plans to Raise Taxes on
Multinational Firms, N.Y. TIMES (last updated June 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/
business/raising-taxes-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/TPL3-JGT8] (reporting that Democrats
and Biden administration officials characterize proposed tax changes as an effort to make
corporations pay their “fair share” of taxes); Christopher Ingraham, Dozens of America’s Biggest
Businesses Paid No Federal Income Tax—Again, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/04/05/corporations-federal-taxes [https://perma.cc/VE7VSQT6] (quoting Biden as “asking corporate America to pay their fair share”).
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many of these apply across all types of businesses.60 But several
features of digital business models make digital firms particularly well
positioned to exploit these weaknesses,61 including substantial value
created by users, as is discussed in more detail below.62 The rise of the
digital economy has, therefore, made the desire to reform the
international tax system more urgent. An array of reforms have been
put forward by academics and policymakers in recent years to address
the failure to adequately tax digital enterprises. These include residual
profit allocation schemes that divide an enterprise’s residual profits63
amongst jurisdictions based on factors such as the destination of the

60. Some of the features of the international tax system that have been cited as contributing
to profit shifting and base erosion include (1) corporate residence rules that allow firms to
establish residence in countries other than those in which their primary business activities occur,
David Elkins, The Myth of Corporate Tax Residence, 9 COLUM. J. TAX L. 5, 5 (2017); Daniel
Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence,
64 TAX L. REV. 377, 429–30 (2011); (2) a trend of allocating primary taxing authority to the
residence country versus the source country when both have claims, Wells & Lowell, supra note
56, at 603–04; (3) the now-outdated “permanent establishment” backstop to source-based
taxation, which requires a physical presence for a country to be considered the source country,
OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 38, at art. 5; Paul Oosterhuis & Amanda Parsons,
Destination-Based Income Taxation: Neither Principled Nor Practical?, 71 TAX L. REV. 515, 533–
34 (2018); and (4) the flexibility of the transfer pricing rules, which allow companies to direct
income, both that taxed under the source principle and the residence principle, to countries with
favorable tax rates, OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFITS SHIFTING 14 (2013)
[hereinafter OECD, ACTION PLAN], https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D6QD-5TKD]; Joe Andrus & Paul Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where
Are We and Where Should We Be Going, 95 TAX MAG. 89, 90 (2017).
61. See OECD, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 8 (explaining that the risk of
companies shifting profits to advantageous jurisdictions is “exacerbated by the digital economy”).
For example, digital enterprises derive a large portion of their revenues from intangible assets as
well as data, and the mobility of these assets and difficulty in valuing them make it easier for
companies to avoid source-based taxation and manipulate transfer pricing rules. See LOWRY,
supra note 5, at 2–3 (outlining transfer pricing strategies in the digital economy); Kleinbard, supra
note 56, at 705 (discussing the increased ability of companies to take advantage of weaknesses in
source and transfer pricing rules in the context of intangible assets).
62. See PIERRE COLLIN & NICOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 4 (Jan. 2013) (explaining that the value created by users is neither taken into account
for tax purposes nor attributed to the users’ countries).
63. Residual profits are profits remaining after taking into account routine returns on
business activities.
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final sale,64 turnover taxes on certain types of revenues,65 and global
minimum tax schemes.66 The Biden administration has embarked on a
number of reforms, such as a revised global minimum tax.67
The most substantial and ambitious project has undoubtedly been
the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project.
BEPS is a multilateral project in which members of the OECD, the
G20, and other states, together representing 139 countries, have joined
together in an attempt to combat corporate tax avoidance.68 The
project released a framework in 2015 outlining fifteen actions to
achieve this goal, such as interest deductibility rules to prevent base
erosion and profit shifting and country-by-country reporting standards
to improve transparency.69 The project continues to work toward
consensus amongst the member states on elements of the framework
and on implementation of the actions.70

64. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV.
497, 507–10 (2009) (residual profits formulary apportionment); MICHAEL DEVEREUX, RESIDUAL
PROFIT ALLOCATION PROPOSAL (2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/resid
ual-profit-allocation-proposal_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VWN-ED9G] (residual profits allocation);
Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 60, at 103 (destination-based cash flow tax).
65. See, e.g., India: Digital Taxation, Enlarging the Scope of “Equalisation Levy”, KPMG
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2020/03/tnf-india-digital-taxation-enlargingthe-scope-of-equalisation-levy.html [https://perma.cc/6AZA-YNG5] (describing India’s equalization
levy on specified services such as online advertising).
Turnover taxes are taxes imposed on gross receipts rather than on income.
66. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 951A (U.S. minimum tax on “global intangible low-taxed income”
earned abroad, known as “GILTI”); OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT,
TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION—REPORT ON PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT:
INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS (Oct. 2020) [hereinafter OECD PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT],
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/abb4c3d1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/abb4c3d1en [https://perma.cc/4DNZ-ECWT] (multilateral reform proposal for a global minimum tax).
67. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-americanjobs-plan [https://perma.cc/CA3B-FYJF].
68. For an overview of the BEPS Project and its widespread implications for the future of
international tax, see Mason, supra note 36, at 354–55.
69. BEPS Actions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions [https://perma.cc/
H67W-L3G8]; OECD, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 5.
70. See generally OECD, OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL TAX REPORT TO G20 FINANCE
MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretarygeneral-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-july-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ6E-P2U5] (outlining
the BEPS Project’s actions and progress for the previous year).
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Action 1 of BEPS addresses the challenges that the rise of the
digital economy has presented to the international tax system.71 After
a series of reports and consultation documents beginning in 2015, the
members approved the release in 2020 of blueprints for two broad
reforms—Pillar One and Pillar Two—to address tax challenges created
by digitalization. Following subsequent negotiations, the members
modified some provisions of those blueprints in fall 2021.72 Pillar Two
aims to stop profit shifting to low- or no-tax jurisdictions through a
global minimum tax.73 Pillar One is presented as a reallocation of taxing
rights over residual profits (profits remaining after allocating routine
profits to jurisdictions where economic activities occur) to the market
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the companies maintain a physical
presence in the jurisdiction.74
Pillar One has flowed from a desire to address the perceived
unfairness of users’ jurisdictions being unable to tax a company’s
income despite the value created by that user base.75 Policymakers in
various countries have highlighted this unfair outcome. The U.K.
71. OECD/G20 Base Erosion & Profit Shifting Project, Action 1: Tax Challenges Arising
from Digitalisation [hereinafter OECD, Action 1], https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/
action1 [https://perma.cc/W7D9-67CS] (outlining the purpose of the Pillar One and Pillar Two
Blueprints that have been proposed as part of the Action 1 initiative).
72. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40; OECD, PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT,
supra note 66; OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, STATEMENT ON A
TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE
DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 2 (2021) [hereinafter OECD, OCTOBER 2021 STATEMENT],
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challengesarising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LRU-MMWW].
The modifications made in the October 2021 statement included changing the definition of
“in-scope” companies from one based on business model to one based on revenue and
profitability thresholds, establishing that 25 percent of residual profits would be reallocated under
the new scheme and allowing for segmentation of business lines when reallocating income under
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1–2.
For a full listing of the reports and other documents released under Action 1 of BEPS, see
OECD, Action 1, supra note 71.
73. OECD, PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT, supra note 66.
74. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, ¶ 6.
75. This Article, as well as the reforms it analyzes, focus on the implications of digital
laborers’ work for the taxation of companies, but the work of digital laborers also has implications
for the taxation of the digital laborers themselves. For example, there is a question of whether the
free services they receive from digital companies should be treated as in-kind income and taxed.
See Louise Fjord Kjærsgaard & Peter Koerver Schmidt, Allocation of the Right To Tax Income
from Digital Intermediary Platforms—Challenges and Possibilities for Taxation in the Jurisdiction
of the User, NORDIC J. COM. L. 146, 159–60 (2018) (arguing that interactions between users and
digital platforms should be treated as taxable barter transactions). The appropriate taxation of
digital laborers is a promising area for future research.
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government explained its concerns about the international tax system’s
treatment of user-generated value directly, stating that
the failure of the international tax rules to take account of . . . usercreated value is leading to outcomes that are inconsistent with the
objectives of those rules, through the creation of a mismatch between
the location in which business profits are taxed and the location in
which business value is created.76

France, other OECD member states, and the European
Commission have expressed similar concerns, reflecting the sentiment
that the current international tax system is not fairly addressing the
rising importance of users in economic activity.77 Although critiques
have largely focused on users of digital platforms, the same dynamics
are at play with respect to data created by digital laborers in other
industries.78
The inability of the users’ jurisdictions to tax companies stems
from the current application of the source principle to users of digital
platforms. The current international tax system considers users only in
their role as consumers; their role as producers, or digital laborers, is
76. HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY:
POSITION PAPER UPDATE 6 (2018) [hereinafter HMT 2018 REPORT], https://assets.publishing.ser
vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/corporate_tax_and
_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6R4-7MQ6].
77. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING
FROM DIGITALISATION—INTERIM REPORT 58 (2018) [hereinafter OECD, INTERIM REPORT],
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264293083-en.pdf?expires=1646962296&id=id&acc
name=guest&checksum=048266BA8CD2F44F2CA87D4630C97681 [https://perma.cc/MM3G-3ZFE]
(explaining the concern by some member nations about the international tax issues presented by
users’ creation of value in digital business models); EUR. COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE: LAYING DOWN RULES RELATING TO THE CORPORATE TAXATION OF A
SIGNIFICANT DIGITAL PRESENCE 1 (2018), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST7419-2018-INIT/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/J4ZS-RQTL] (explaining that “the current [international
tax] rules no longer fit the present context . . . where user generated content and data collection
have become core activities for the value creation of digital businesses”); see COLLIN & COLIN,
supra note 62, at 4 (noting the pivotal nature of “the data and ‘free labour’ provided by users,
which are not yet taken into consideration for tax purposes, even though they are at the heart of
value creation, easily attributed to a given country and common to all of the dominant business
models of today’s digital economy” (emphasis omitted)).
78. The focus on value created by users of digital platforms is likely attributable to the lack
of recognition and exploitation of customer data creation at present in other industries. However,
as this data creation becomes more widespread and businesses in other industries begin to exploit
customer data more frequently, their work may become a greater focus. See generally Itai
Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 407 (predicting that the
reach of proposals to tax companies based on user-created value will expand to a broader range
of companies as the IoT expands).
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ignored when jurisdictions allocate taxing authority.79 As is explained
in Part I.A above, the source principle characterizes the source of
economic activity leading to income in terms of production. The mere
presence of customers or users in a country does not make that country
the locus of economic activities giving rise to income under the source
principle. Because digital laborers’ production role is ignored, their
home countries are not considered the source country with respect to
income directly attributable to their work.
For example, consider a hypothetical social media company,
FaceJournal. FaceJournal earns the vast majority of its revenue from
online advertising. It has a substantial user base in India, and 10
percent of its annual advertising revenues come from online
advertisements directed toward users in India. By creating content and
navigating and interacting with others on the platform, these Indiabased users provide FaceJournal with the data necessary to properly
“target” online advertising specifically to them. FaceJournal is a U.S.
company. Development and maintenance of the platform occur in the
United States along with all activities related to the sale of advertising
services. In this instance, India does not have taxing authority over any
of FaceJournal’s income associated with its online advertising in India
despite India-based users’ role in producing the advertising services.
In another example, consider a retailer that sells data created by a
customer in South Korea through the customer’s purchase patterns and
personal information submitted by the customer in conjunction with
their purchases. South Korea is not considered the source of any
portion of the income from the sale of that data even though at least a
portion of the activities that gave rise to the income (the creation of the
data) were performed there.
The outcome highlighted in these examples has sparked
conversations on possible reforms. The Pillar One Blueprint has
evolved from one line of reforms meant to address this unfairness of
users’ jurisdictions, as well as the jurisdictions of customers more
generally, not having taxing rights over corporate income by allocating
79. HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY:
POSITION PAPER 8–9 (2017) [hereinafter HMT 2017 REPORT], https://assets.publishing.ser
vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661458/corporate_tax_and
_the_digital_economy_position_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ5P-7XS5] (“[U]ser-generated
value is not captured under the existing international tax framework, which focuses exclusively
on the physical activities of a business itself in determining where profits should be allocated for
corporate tax purposes.”).
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a portion of corporate profits to the market jurisdiction. In 2017 and
2018 position papers, the U.K. government took the position that user
participation creates value for certain businesses and articulated a
possible reform to reallocate taxing authority to the user jurisdiction.80
The U.K. government proposed a reform whereby a percentage of the
residual profits of a company would be reallocated to the user
jurisdiction in recognition of user-created value.81 Following the U.K.
user participation proposal, the European Commission put forth a
similar proposal, inspired by the same insight that the value created by
users was not being taken into account in the international tax system.82
The European Commission proposed a reform whereby a taxable
presence would be established if a company had a “significant digital
presence” in a country—a significant digital presence corresponds with
a large user or customer base.83 Profits would then be allocated to the
significant digital presence based on factors including the number of
users and amount of data collected in a country.84
In February 2019, the OECD Inclusive Framework included a
user participation proposal with a similar design to the U.K. proposal
as one of three reforms under consideration for Pillar One.85 Each of
these three reforms addressed value creation in the user and market
jurisdictions that were not recognized and taxed under the existing
international tax system.86 In October 2019, the OECD announced a
“unified approach,” a reform proposal which combined elements of the

80. Id. at 11; see also HMT 2018 REPORT, supra note 76, at 2–3 (updating 2017 report based
on stakeholder feedback).
81. HMT 2017 REPORT, supra note 79, at 11.
82. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 77, at 1 (highlighting the misalignment between the place
where value is created and the place where profits of a digital company are taxed under the
current international system in business models where user-generated content and data collection
are central to value creation).
83. Id. at 7–8.
84. Id. at 8–9.
85. See OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, PUBLIC CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY
9–11 (2019), www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-challengesof-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/F82X-44YT].
86. Id. The other proposals presented were (1) the marketing intangibles proposal, which
allocated income associated with marketing intangibles, such as brand and trade name, to the
market jurisdiction and (2) the substantial economic presence proposal, which allowed a taxable
nexus to be established through sustained economic activities and then allocated income between
countries with a taxable presence based on a fractional apportionment method using factors such
as sales and, in some cases, users. Id. at 11–17.
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three reforms presented in the February report.87 This unified
approach, described in detail in the Pillar One Blueprint, draws from
the principles underlying the user participation proposals in
recognizing that businesses can “create meaningful value” from
interactions with users and customers.88
The Pillar One Blueprint creates what it describes as a “new taxing
right” that it grants to the market jurisdiction.89 The reform reallocates
taxing authority over 25 percent of a company’s residual profits, called
Amount A, to the market jurisdiction in recognition of the value
created there.90 This new taxing right is layered on top of the existing
international tax law’s system of allocating taxing authority amongst
countries, including current transfer pricing rules, which will continue
to be used to allocate taxing authority over companies’ routine profits
and residual profits not included in Amount A.91 This new method of
residual profit allocation to market jurisdictions will only apply to the
multinational companies with global revenues above €20 billion and
profitability of more than 10 percent,92 which represents approximately
one hundred companies.93 One hundred forty-one countries entered
into an agreement in fall 2021 to incorporate the blueprint’s reforms
into their domestic laws and bilateral treaties to come into effect in
2023.94
Another line of reforms that have been put forward to grant user
jurisdictions, as well as in some cases customer jurisdictions more

87. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, PUBLIC CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT, SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE 2
(2019) [hereinafter OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH], www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultationdocument-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/US5P-26L9].
88. Id. at 7.
89. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, ¶ 10.
90. OECD, OCTOBER 2021 STATEMENT, supra note 72, at 2.
91. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, ¶ 10 (“The new taxing right (Amount
A) would be an overlay to the existing nexus and profit allocation rules.”).
92. OECD, OCTOBER 2021 STATEMENT, supra note 72, at 1. Extractives and regulated
financial services companies are excluded from the reform. Id. The scope of the Pillar One
Blueprint reforms may expand to multinational companies with revenues over ten billion euros
in seven years, contingent on review by the Inclusive Framework members. Id.
93. Press Release, OECD, International Community Strikes a Ground-Breaking Tax Deal
for the Digital Age (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/international-communitystrikes-a-ground-breaking-tax-deal-for-the-digital-age.htm [https://perma.cc/5RPV-QNCN].
94. OECD, International Collaboration To End Tax Avoidance, https://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/international-community-strikes-a-ground-breaking-tax-deal-for-the-digital-age.htm [https://
perma.cc/QH9X-T9Q8].
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generally, taxing authority over corporate income are digital services
taxes. Although the exact contours of various countries’ digital services
taxes differ, they are generally structured as a small turnover tax
(between 2 percent and 5 percent) on revenues associated with digital
activities.95 Revenues associated with digital activities can include
revenues attributable to online advertising revenues, revenues earned
through online marketplaces, and revenues generated through the sale
of user data, all of which can be linked at least in part to user activities.96
Digital services taxes are unilateral reforms, undertaken by
individual countries rather than on a coordinated international basis,
which represents a departure from customary practices in international
tax law.97 Countries have generally framed digital services taxes as
temporary measures that will be repealed if more comprehensive
reforms granting taxing authority to users’ jurisdictions are achieved
on a multilateral basis.98 That commitment has been affirmed by those
countries who joined the Pillar One Blueprint in October 2021.99
However, in the interim, the scattered nature of these reforms have

95. See Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the
Consumption Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 147–54 (2020) (summarizing the characteristics
and design of various countries’ digital services taxes); see also Teri Sprackland & Stephanie
Soong Johnston, French DST Signed Into Law Despite U.S., Competition Concerns, 95 TAX
NOTES INT’L 444, 444 (July 29, 2019), www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/digital-economy/
french-dst-signed-law-despite-us-competition-concerns/2019/07/29/29s8b [https://perma.cc/K6Q8WRZB] (explaining French tax on 3 percent of revenues related to digital services); Stephanie
Soong Johnston, U.K. Goes It Alone With Digital Tax Pending OECD Solution, TAX NOTES INT’L
640, 640 (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/search-page-list?esq%3Du.k.%2Bgoes%2
Bit%2Balone%26from%3D0%26size%3D20%26orderby%3Dsearchdate%26order%3Ddesc
%26filterterm%3Dsearchtitle%26menu_type%3D0 [https://perma.cc/7SNP-NSPZ] (noting U.K.
tax on 2 percent of revenues from digital services); Stephanie Soong Johnston, Austria Proposes
5 Percent Digital Advertising Tax, TAX NOTES INT’L 182, 182 (Apr. 8, 2019), www.taxnotes.com/
tax-notes-international/digital-economy/austria-proposes-5-percent-digital-advertising-tax/2019/
04/08/29bc3 [https://perma.cc/6F45-A3BD] (detailing an Austrian proposal for a 5 percent tax on
digital services revenue).
96. See Kim, supra note 95 (summarizing the characteristics and design of various countries’
digital services taxes).
97. Cf. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime, supra
note 42, at 1 (characterizing international tax as a form of customary international law in which
“countries are not free to adopt any international tax rules they please, but rather operate in the
context of the regime”).
98. See Faulhaber, supra note 5, at 189 (noting that most countries have stated that they will
eliminate unilateral digital tax proposals if an international consensus on digital tax reforms is
reached).
99. OECD, OCTOBER 2021 STATEMENT, supra note 72, at 6.
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added uncertainty into the international tax system.100 This uncertainty
stems from factors such as multinational companies’ attempts to
comply with dozens of new technical rules and challenges to the
underlying legality of the tax measures.101
C. Weaknesses of the Pillar One Blueprint and Digital Services Taxes
The proposals culminating in the Pillar One Blueprint, as well as
digital services taxes, represent fundamental changes to both the
theoretical and structural framework of international taxation. Though
the failings of the international tax system in the digital economy may
require fundamental shifts in tax law in some instances, it is essential
to minimize structural and normative disruptions and only pursue
radical reforms when they are necessary—this approach helps to
maintain continuity, predictability, and fairness in the international tax
system. The major structural and theoretical changes contained in
current reform proposals are not necessary to address the issue of
digital laborers’ jurisdictions being unable to tax income stemming
directly from their work.
Most significantly, these proposals fundamentally alter the
normative underpinnings of the international tax system by creating a
new taxing right—a taxing right for the market jurisdiction.102 The
existence of customers or users alone can grant taxing authority to a
country. This is a drastic departure from the current approach to
source-based taxation, which, as is discussed above, grants taxing
authority based on production, not consumption.
It may be appropriate to grant the market jurisdiction taxing
authority over a company’s income because of the increased
importance of factors like brand and customer or user networks in the

100. See Faulhaber, supra note 5, at 189–91 (outlining the technical and political challenges
that unilateral digital tax reforms insert into the international tax system).
101. See id. See generally Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, The Legality of Digital Taxes in
Europe, 40 VA. TAX. REV. 175 (2020) (arguing that digital services taxes are a violation of E.U.
law).
102. OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH, supra note 87, at 6 (“The Secretariat’s proposal is
designed to address the tax challenges of the digitalisation of the economy and to grant new taxing
rights to the countries where users of highly digitalised business models are located.”); OECD,
PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 11 (2019), www.oecd.org/tax/beps/
programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-dig
italisation-of-the-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM98-HV98]; see also Christians, supra note 55,
at 590 (framing the OECD’s project as one of defining a new taxing right to promote fairness in
a digitalized economy).
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modern economic environment. In these instances, customers are
creating value in their role as consumers on the demand side of
economic activities. Reforms such as the Pillar One Blueprint that
allocate taxing authority to the market jurisdiction may, as a result, be
necessary and appropriate reforms to fairly account for this type of
value creation. However, with respect to the value that users and
customers create when making content and data that companies
directly and currently monetize, a new taxing right for the market
jurisdiction is not necessary to allow their home countries to tax income
associated with their work. As this Article explains, because they are
functioning as producers, their home countries are the source countries
under the current theoretical framework of international tax.
The reforms leading up to the Pillar One Blueprint and digital
services taxes also represent major shifts in the structure and design of
international tax. Digital services taxes as well as earlier residual profit
allocation proposals contemplate “ring-fencing”103 certain segments of
the economy, creating a system of taxation that applies only to certain
types of business activities.104 Even though the final iteration of the
Pillar One Blueprint has removed ring-fencing based on industry by
defining in-scope companies based on revenue and profitability rather
than on type of business, the reform only applies to companies that
exceed high revenue and profitability measures (approximately one
hundred companies),105 thus resulting in the reform not applying
consistently across global businesses.
The Pillar One Blueprint, as well as the reform proposals that
influenced it, require worldwide apportionment of a multinational
company’s global residual profits, a major departure from current
practice that brings a variety of concerns over design and

103. “Ring-fencing” refers to tax policies that tax one type of business activity or industry in
a different manner than other business activities or industries.
104. E.g., Kim, supra note 95, at 152 (listing the scope of various digital service tax proposals,
which in all cases are limited to certain digital business models); HMT 2018 REPORT, supra note
76, at 25 (proposing that user participation proposal be limited to “digital businesses that are
deriving material value from user participation”); EUR. COMM’N, supra note 77, at 2 (proposing
reform specific to digital business activities); OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH, supra note 87, at 5
(limiting OECD unified approach to highly digitalized business models and consumer-facing
businesses); OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, ¶¶ 24, 31 (limiting the scope of the
Pillar One proposal to automated digital services and consumer-facing business models).
105. OECD, OCTOBER 2021 STATEMENT, supra note 72, at 1.
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administrability.106 These questions are significant and, as Professor
Lilian Faulhaber has explained, “raise fundamental issues such as how
to determine value, where to locate value, how to allocate income, and
many others.”107 These questions entail problems of continuity,
predictability, and compliance costs for taxpayers. Fundamental design
changes also burden government tax authorities, which will have to
build up new systems of administration and implementation. Lowerincome countries with fewer resources to adapt and administer new tax
laws could be particularly impacted by this burden. Issues with
administrability and enforcement also have the potential to lead to
inequitable outcomes because they may increase noncompliance
risk.108
Digital services taxes are turnover taxes on revenue rather than
income taxes. Taxing revenue, as opposed to income, is unusual in
international tax, and many argue that turnover taxes are inefficient
taxes that will be borne primarily by consumers and lower demand.109
Digital services taxes also contain features that many argue are

106. The Inclusive Framework acknowledged these design and administrability challenges in
the Pillar One Blueprint and highlighted further work that needed to be done with respect to
scope, the determination of the amount of profit to be reallocated, and tax certainty. OECD,
PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 72, ¶ 8.
107. Faulhaber, supra note 5, at 176.
108. See Stefan C. Hammerl & Lily T. Zechner, Taxing Profit and Consumption in Market
Jurisdictions: Equity and Administrability in the Digital Era 3 (Graz Law, Working Paper No. 062021, 2021).
109. E.g., Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax on the Verge of Implementation, 67 CANADIAN
TAX J. 1135, 1148 (“Another popular (and casual) assertion among DST opponents is that the
DST will ultimately be passed on to final consumers—especially in the jurisdiction that imposes
the tax.”); DANIEL BUNN, TAX FOUND., A SUMMARY OF CRITICISMS OF THE EU DIGITAL TAX
6 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20181022090015/Tax-Foundation-FF618.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PP69-7GTU] (“Historically, turnover taxes have been rejected as poor tax policy because they are
inefficient, create barriers to economic growth, and generally considered to be unfair tax policy.”).
This criticism was bolstered by a Deloitte study that specifically analyzed the impact of the
French digital services tax. The study predicted that 55 percent of the tax incidence would fall on
consumers, 40 percent on businesses that use digital platforms, and 5 percent on the digital firms
themselves. JULIEN PELLEFIGUE, DELOITTE & TAJ, THE FRENCH DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: AN
ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT 2 (2019), https://blog.avocats.deloitte.fr/content/uploads/
2020/03/dst-impact-assessment-march-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/796E-B89K]. But see Wei Cui,
The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense, 73 TAX L. REV. 69, 103–08 (2019) (pushing back
against the claims that “the DST must be a bad tax because it is based on revenue” and that the
tax will be passed along to the imposing country’s consumers); Kim, supra note 95, 176–78
(arguing that the multisided nature of digital business models and the fact that many digital
companies have monopolistic market positions may result in companies absorbing the tax rather
than passing it along to consumers).
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discriminatory against certain firms and comprise a tariff.110
Furthermore, the fact that digital services taxes are being enacted
unilaterally by a multitude of governments across the world has
contributed to chaos in the international tax system.111
The most considerable weakness of these reforms points to a
question of coherence in the international tax system. The reforms
share the flaw (one that is also present in the current international tax
system) that they do not recognize that users and customers are
functioning in a similar way to a workforce when producing content
and data for companies—they do not recognize the production role
that they are serving, viewing them instead as merely consumers. As a
result, both the current international tax system and these proposed
reforms tax what are essentially the same economic activities—people
producing goods and performing services for a company—differently
when they are performed in the context of digital business models. This
result is incoherent and leads to the sentiment that the international
tax system’s taxation of the digital economy is unfair.
D. A New Path Forward—Digital Laborers as a Workforce
This Article advocates approaching the question of how digital
laborers’ work should impact their home countries’ ability to tax
companies by beginning with an evaluation of the role that digital
laborers fulfill for companies. When they are creating content and data
for companies, digital laborers are functioning in a similar role to a
traditional workforce. If the international tax system recognizes this
function and treats them in the same way as it does a workforce, digital
laborers’ home countries are the places of production—and thus the
source countries under the current application of the source principle
in the international tax system. It is not necessary to uproot the
theoretical framework of international tax and create a new taxing

110. See, e.g., Mason & Parada, supra note 101, at 183–84 (arguing that digital services taxes
violate the European Union’s fundamental freedoms); Bunn, supra note 109 (“In the United
States, where the largest of these multinational companies are headquartered, it is likely that the
digital turnover tax would fit into the definition of ‘unreasonable, discriminatory, or unjustifiable’
as laid out in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.”); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & ZHIYAO
(LUCY) LU, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PROPOSED DIGITAL
SERVICES TAX: A DE FACTO TARIFF 8–10 (2018), www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb1815.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F2C-QRJZ] (summarizing the ways in which various digital services tax
proposals function as a tariff).
111. See Faulhaber, supra note 5, at 190–91 (outlining the technical and legal uncertainties
brought about by the various unilateral reform measures).
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right in order to give digital laborers’ home countries taxing authority
over income directly attributable to their content and data creation.
Once digital laborers are viewed through this framework and in
the same way as a traditional workforce, an overhaul of the structure
of the international tax system also becomes unnecessary. Under the
U.S. statutory source rules, digital laborers’ home countries are the
source jurisdictions with respect to most of the ways in which
companies currently and directly monetize their work. And,
internationally, taxing authority can be allocated to their countries
through an incremental rebalancing of taxing authority between source
and residence jurisdictions. From the perspective of implementation,
the impact of their work on the allocation of taxing authority between
jurisdictions can be determined under the current system of transfer
pricing and calculating the relative contribution of business activities
in different jurisdictions to the production of an item of income.112
Because this framework allows taxing authority to be granted to digital
laborers’ home countries under the current structure of the
international tax system, the reform can apply consistently across all
global businesses operating under the current system, rather than
through limited application to a certain subset of companies.
This approach of treating digital laborers in the same way as a
traditional workforce also coexists with the reform put forward by the
OECD Pillar One Blueprint. As discussed in Part I.C, users and
customers often create value for companies in their role as consumers,
as well as in their role as producers, through factors such as network
effects and brand loyalty,113 and it might be appropriate to allocate a
new taxing right to the market jurisdiction based on that value creation.
However, even if the OECD Pillar One Blueprint is implemented, the
framework of treating digital laborers in the same way as a traditional
workforce can still be applied because the Pillar One Blueprint layers
the new taxing right on top of international tax law’s existing system
for allocating taxing authority amongst countries.114 The existing
source and transfer pricing can be used to allocate taxing authority over
income stemming directly from digital laborers’ content and data
112. The existing system is certainly not perfect, but it has undergone revision as part of the
OECD/BEPS Project and has the advantage of continuity and predictability for taxpayers and
taxing authorities as well as consistent application across global companies. See Part IV below for
a discussion of the challenges of implementing the transfer pricing rules.
113. See infra note 115 for additional discussion of other types of value creation by users and
customers.
114. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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creation, and the OECD Pillar One Blueprint’s model of allocating
profits amongst market jurisdictions can be applied with respect to
residual profits.
Treating digital laborers in the same way as a traditional
workforce is a fundamental reworking of the U.S. international tax
system. It alters the doctrinal approach to the distinction between
customers and labor in tax law and deviates from the traditional
definition of an employee. But this reworking is less disruptive than the
upending of the theoretical basis and structure of international tax that
has been put forward by other reforms. And, even more importantly,
it is a necessary reform in its own right. Without a shift in tax law’s
treatment of digital labor, the incoherence of taxing equivalent
economic activities differently will remain, ultimately threatening the
legitimacy of the international tax system.
The next Part explains how digital laborers serve in a similar role
to a workforce when creating content and data for companies and how
companies directly monetize that work in the digital economy.
II. DIGITAL LABORERS’ WORK
This Part begins by introducing the phenomenon of digital labor
and its study in fields outside tax law. It then outlines the key ways that
digital laborers provide work for digital firms and how these firms
directly and currently monetize digital laborers’ work. It next analyzes
the unique features of digital labor and differences between a digital
labor workforce and a traditional workforce. It argues that, despite the
unique features of digital labor, digital laborers function in a similar
way to a traditional workforce when creating content and data for
companies. Digital laborers, therefore, should be treated in the same
way as a workforce when determining the allocation of taxing authority
over income directly attributable to their work in order to maintain
coherence in the international tax system. Neither this Part nor this
Article more broadly addresses value that users and customers create
indirectly for firms through occurrences such as network effects.115

115. This is an important and complex issue. Users and customers create an enormous
amount of value for companies that is not currently or directly monetized. For example, on social
media platforms, users’ content creation as well as their consumption of other users’ content
makes the platform more valuable for other users, driving positive network effects and leading to
overall increases in the revenues and value of companies. Value creation through network effects
is not captured by the current international tax system. See COLLIN & COLIN, supra note 62, at
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A. The Phenomenon of Digital Labor
The digital economy features business models in which users and
customers play dual roles. In these business models, they act both as
producers of goods and services through their content and data
creation and as consumers through their purchases of products and
services. The value-creating role of users and customers, beyond any
payments for goods and services, is a central feature of the modern
digital economy and a driver of many companies’ success.116
Policymakers and scholars have identified this value-creating role,
most commonly with respect to users of digital platforms, but, as is
discussed elsewhere in this Article, digital laborers create value for
companies in a range of industries, particularly through data
creation.117
These policymakers and scholars do vary, however, with respect
to how they conceptualize the value-creating role of users and
79–80. Data production is also an important driver of overall company value and revenues
because companies are able to use customer data to improve and create new products and
services, so-called “data network effects.” See Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Big
Data Boom Is the Innovation Story of Our Time, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2011), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/the-big-data-boom-is-the-innovation-story-ofour-time/248215 [https://perma.cc/K53T-MAJL]. The question of whether and how different
forms of value creation should be integrated into the international tax system has been a topic of
debate in recent tax scholarship. See generally, e.g., Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, Taxing
Where Value Is Created: What’s “User Involvement” Got To Do With It?, 47 INTERTAX 161 (2019)
(arguing for an international tax system recalibration based on sustained user relationships);
Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, Taxing Income Where Value Is Created, 22 FLA.
TAX REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that rigorous examination of the meaning of “value” could prompt
changes in the consensus on allocation); Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation, supra
note 78 (examining the United Kingdom’s proposal to account for user value creation in digital
platforms).
This indirect value creation, which users and customers create both in their role as
consumers as well as digital laborers, lends support to the notion that the market jurisdiction
should be granted a taxing right through reforms such as the Pillar One Blueprint. As is discussed
in Part I.C above, unlike value created in their role as producers, a fundamental shift in the
principle of source and substantial reforms to the structure of international tax may be necessary
to fairly tax value created by users and customers in their role as consumers. And, as is discussed
in Part I.D above, this type of reform could coexist with the approach advocated by this Article,
granting taxing authority over income that is directly attributable to digital laborers’ work under
the international tax system’s current approach while granting taxing authority to the market
jurisdiction over residual profits based on indirect value creation.
116. As is discussed in more detail in Part II.D below, there are some business models in
which customers or patrons create value for companies outside of content and data creation.
While this hybrid role is far more prevalent in the digital economy, the same conclusions reached
in this Article with respect to digital laborers also apply in the context of those business models.
117. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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customers. One viewpoint supports treating digital laborers in the same
way as a workforce—this is the view that users and customers are
creating value within the enterprise itself, serving a production role.118
Others acknowledge the value created by users’ activities but view the
relationship between users and digital firms as a transactional one that
occurs outside of the firm—a relationship in which these users and
customers are still in the role of a consumer but are exchanging their
data or content rather than money for services in a type of barter
exchange.119 This view of customers and users engaged in a barter
exchange in a consumer role outside the company counters the
argument that they serve a similar economic role to a traditional
workforce.
This Article agrees with the view that users and customers create
value within a firm as producers. First, users and customers do not in
all cases receive free products or services in exchange for their content
and data creation. Second, in the cases where they do receive free
products or services, the fact that the “payment” provided to the
company is a product of their labor, rather than monetary, makes the
interaction closer in nature to a worker creating value for a firm
through labor. Digital laborers’ data and content creation produce
value within a firm in a similar manner as a workforce.
The phenomenon of digital labor was first identified and studied
outside of legal scholarship. In 2000, Italian media studies theorist
Tiziana Terranova identified the role of free labor as a value-creating
118. See, e.g., OECD, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 25 (describing how some member
countries view user contributions as value generation within a firm); HMT 2018 REPORT, supra
note 76, at 9 (“[F]or some types of digital businesses, users can be seen participating in a nontraditional value chain and performing supply-side functions that would historically have been
undertaken by the business itself.”); COLLIN & COLIN, supra note 62, at 49 (describing the free
work of users as an extension of Coase’s theory of the firm, providing companies with the
opportunity to inspire users to engage in activities that are incorporated into the production
chain). But see Wolfgang Schön, One Answer to Why and How To Tax the Digitalized Economy
17 (Max Planck Inst. for Tax L. & Pub. Fin., Working Paper No. 2019-10, 2019) (noting that
content and data creation by users in digital business models “do[] not turn the user into a special
category of employee within the firm and his contributions do not reflect value created by the
taxpayer”). See generally LANIER, supra note 21 (identifying users as a source of labor for firms);
POSNER & WEYL, supra note 21 (arguing that customers serve as a source of labor for firms when
creating data).
119. See, e.g., OECD, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 25 (explaining that some member
countries view user contributions and data collection as transactions between users and digital
companies); Kjærsgaard & Schmidt, supra note 75, at 159–60 (identifying free labor provided by
users of digital platforms and arguing that the economic arrangement between users and
platforms should be treated as a barter transaction).
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mechanism for digital companies in her analysis of the free work that
chat room moderators played for AOL in the mid-1990s.120 In the years
that followed, authors in fields ranging from media theory to sociology
to critical theory joined the conversation on the implications of free
content production by digital laborers.121 These scholars have
presented the “consistent analysis of digital labor as a continuation of
the social relations surrounding the traditional work-place.”122
The rise of the data economy in recent years has expanded the
analysis of digital labor from content creation to data creation. The
topic of digital labor and data creation entered the law and economics
literature in Professors Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl’s 2018 essay,
Data as Labor.123 Posner and Weyl argue that data is a product of a
data subject’s labor.124 They are joined in this characterization of data
as a form of labor by other scholars, such as Jaron Lanier.125 The
potentially exploitative nature of companies’ collection and use of
digital laborers’ data has been highlighted as part of these
discussions.126 Although a full discussion of the exploitation of the free

120. Tiziana Terranova, Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy, 18 SOC.
TEXT 33, 33–34 (2000).
121. See generally DIGITAL LABOR: THE INTERNET AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY
(Trebor Scholz ed., 2013) (collecting essays from scholars across disciplines on the phenomenon
of digital labor).
122. Trebor Scholz, Introduction: Why Does Digital Labor Matter Now?, in DIGITAL LABOR:
THE INTERNET AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY, supra note 121, at 11.
123. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 21, at 205–49.
124. Id. at 207–09.
125. See, e.g., LANIER, supra note 21, at 15–17; Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra, Leonard Goff, Diego
Jiménez-Hernández, Jaron Lanier & E. Glen Weyl, Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving
Beyond “Free”, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 38, 39–40 (2018).
126. Christian Fuchs, Labor in Informational Capitalism and on the Internet, 26 INFO. SOC’Y
179, 192 (2010) (“The notion that knowledge labor, such as the one performed online by
producers, is productive, then also means that under capitalist class relations it is exploited and
that all knowledge workers, unpaid and paid, are part of an exploited class.”).
Scholars have characterized the exploitation of digital laborers through the collection and
use of their data as a new form of colonialism, NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, THE COSTS
OF CONNECTION: HOW DATA IS COLONIZING HUMAN LIFE AND APPROPRIATING IT FOR
CAPITALISM 3–6 (2019), and even a form of slavery, Mick Chisnall, Digital Slavery, Time for
Abolition?, 41 POL’Y STUD. 488, 488 (2020). And the need to seek radical reforms to ensure that
the value created by data does not accrue exclusively to the wealthy and powerful has been a
focus of recent political economy scholarship. See generally Barbara Prainsack, The Political
Economy of Digital Data: Introduction to the Special Issue, 41 POL’Y STUD. 439 (2020) (discussing
the impetus for and importance of a journal issue devoted to the political economy of data).
As discussed in the Introduction, Posner, Weyl, Lanier and others who have argued that
data is a product of labor have also advocated for digital laborers to be paid for their work. See
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work of digital laborers is beyond the scope of this Article, it
undoubtedly supports the sentiment that digital laborers’ home
countries being unable to tax income attributable to their work is
unfair.
B. Examples of Digital Laborers’ Work
Digital laborers’ work can be broadly divided into two
categories—the creation of various types of content, which
predominantly occurs via digital platforms, and the production of data,
which occurs across a vast array of business models.
1. Content Creation. Digital laborers’ content creation is a
dominant feature of the digital economy. This Subsection discusses two
central examples of content creation by digital laborers—social media
content and online reviews and ratings.
a. Social Media Content. In the context of social media and
information sharing platforms, digital laborers create entertainment
content. When Facebook’s digital laborers post news articles, status
updates, or photos, they deliver Facebook content that provides other
Facebook customers with information and entertainment—they create
a product. This content creation is rapid and massive. Every minute,
for example, Twitter users send approximately 456,000 tweets and
Instagram users post approximately 46,740 photos.127
Reddit is one example of a social media website that relies on
digital laborers to produce content. Reddit is an online platform
through which digital laborers create and post content in various
forums addressing specific topics—these digital laborers have created
over one hundred thousand forums, and the platform has over fifty
million daily users on average.128 Reddit goes even further than most
digital platforms in its reliance on digital laborers as its workforce. Not
only do Reddit’s digital laborers produce the platform’s content but
some of its digital laborers also act as moderators for forums without
compensation, setting standards for the community of users and
supra note 21 and accompanying text. Whether digital laborers are or are not paid for their work
does not impact the division of taxing authority over companies’ income amongst jurisdictions.
See supra Part I.A (explaining the allocation of taxing authority over corporate income in
international tax law).
127. Marr, supra note 9.
128. About, REDDIT, https://www.redditinc.com [https://perma.cc/3Q8K-X4SV].
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policing content posted to the forum.129 This same model of relying on
digital laborers to create the content that entertains and informs
consumers is used by countless other social media companies.
This platform model contrasts with more traditional media firms
where the firm itself both produces and disseminates the content.
Radio and television stations devote substantial resources to creating
the content that they then distribute to customers. A large number of
employees are needed to create this content. For example,
approximately 37 percent of the CBS Corporation’s operating
expenses for 2018 were for direct costs related to internally developed
television and film content and related expenses such as on-air talent.130
The CBS Corporation employed approximately seventeen thousand
staff members in 2018.131 Even though CBS’s public financial filings do
not disclose the percentage of employees that are devoted to content
creation, it can be assumed that a substantial portion of CBS’s
seventeen-thousand-person workforce is devoted to creating the
content that is disseminated to CBS’s viewers. In sharp contrast,
Reddit had approximately seven hundred employees at beginning of
2021132 and reached a market valuation of $10 billion that year.133 Social
media enterprises leverage digital laborers’ content production and are
able to operate and produce revenue and income using a fraction of
the workforce that traditional media enterprises employ.
There are many other models of social media platforms that rely,
at least in part, on the content creation of digital laborers. For example,
media hosting websites, such as YouTube, rely on digital laborers to

129. See Moderator Guidelines for Healthy Communities, REDDIT, https://www.reddit
inc.com/policies/moderator-guidelines [https://perma.cc/9ECJ-QLZZ]; Kim Renfro, For Whom
the Troll Trolls: A Day in the Life of a Reddit Moderator, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2016, 12:27 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-a-reddit-moderator-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/R2GG-5XGS].
130. CBS Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) II-12 (Feb. 15, 2019).
131. Id. at I-16.
132. Jon Porter, Reddit To Double Employees After Raising $250 Billion, VERGE (Feb. 9,
2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/9/22274077/reddit-funding-round-250-million-doubleemployees-investment [https://perma.cc/G48Y-LEHN].
133. Meghan Bobrowsky, Reddit Valuation Soars to $10 Billion in New Funding Round,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2021, 12:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/reddit-taps-investorappetite-for-startups-further-raising-valuation-11628766000 [https://perma.cc/RD4L-2QML]. The
CBS Corporation had a market capitalization of approximately $25 billion at the end of 2019.
ViacomCBS Market Cap 2006-2021, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/
VIAC/viacomcbs/market-cap [https://perma.cc/PR3H-4WER].
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upload video content to the platform.134 In this instance, digital laborers
are creating the core entertainment product delivered to other users.
In other contexts, digital companies do themselves create content and
provide other services beyond maintaining a platform and delivering
information, and digital laborers’ work supplements the activities
performed by the company. These business models blend together
social media and other services. On the music platform Spotify, for
example, digital laborers are able to create playlists that they can then
make public to other Spotify listeners.135 These digital-laborer-created
playlists supplement the playlists and other products and services that
Spotify itself creates and provides, enhancing the value of the central
product that Spotify offers to consumers (that is, licensing music
content and providing consumers access to such content) and adding
to the services offered to consumers when they join the platform.
b. Online Reviews and Ratings. Another form of content created
by digital laborers includes reviews and questions and answers in
online marketplaces, such as Airbnb, Apple’s App Store, and Amazon.
Airbnb’s digital laborers, for example, provide valuable information
through reviews. Guests on Airbnb can provide numerical ratings of
several specific elements of the accommodation and their experience
with an Airbnb host and can also provide narrative reviews of the host
and their experiences.136 These ratings and reviews then guide future
guests in their choice of accommodations, and the sharing of this
information is part of the service provided by the platform.
Similarly, digital laborers on Apple’s App Store provide ratings
and reviews of the applications available through the App Store. The

134. YouTube does compensate digital laborers who post videos on the platform once they
have reached a certain level of viewership. The size of these thresholds and their terms result in
most individuals who post videos to YouTube not receiving compensation. See Brett Molina, How
YouTube Creators Get Paid for Ads and Why Some Have Been Angry, USA TODAY, https://
www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/04/04/how-youtube-creators-get-paid-ads-and-why-somehave-been-angry/485032002 [https://perma.cc/7N58-Z5K5] (last updated Apr. 4, 2018, 7:08 PM);
YouTube Partner Earnings Overview, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
72902?hl=en [https://perma.cc/F58R-Z8ZD].
135. Share from Spotify, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/article/share-from-spotify
[https://perma.cc/7TQB-DMNF] (describing how users can share playlists and other items with
fellow users).
136. See generally How Airbnb Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/d/howairbnbworks
[https://perma.cc/5NQW-YLAJ] (describing the platform and providing links to search for more
information).
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massive volume of Apple’s digital laborers results in a huge quantity of
reviews. The popular dating app Bumble, for example, has one million
ratings137 while the social networking app Instagram has twenty-two
million ratings.138
For each product sold on Amazon, the platform allows digital
laborers to post reviews of the product as well as answer Amazon’s
customers’ questions about the product. These reviews and answers
provide Amazon’s customers with extensive and detailed information
about the products sold via the platform. For example, the Toshiba
thirty-two-inch HD Smart TV has over twenty-four thousand reviews
on Amazon.139 Over one thousand questions about the product have
been answered—some by the seller but the majority by digital
laborers.140 These questions range from whether the TV is Bluetooth
compatible to whether it is worth the investment if the customer
already owns certain other products.141
In each of these examples, digital laborers serve a similar role to
the one that a salesperson would traditionally serve in a typical brickand-mortar business model. Digital laborers provide information on
specific products and direct customers to the products that are most
relevant to them. Digital firms, therefore, are able to employ the work
of digital laborers to serve a role that firms have historically had to hire
employees or agents to perform.
In the online marketplace examples discussed above, digital
laborers’ reviews and ratings provide a valuable sales function for the
marketplace, but they are only one component of the services that the
online marketplace provides to third-party retailers. On review
platforms such as Tripadvisor and Yelp, digital laborers’ content
production serves a similar role to content production in the context of
social media companies—they provide the information that is the

137. Bumble, APP STORE PREVIEW, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bumble-dating-friendsbizz/id930441707 [https://perma.cc/3NUC-PVBR].
138. Instagram, APP STORE PREVIEW, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/instagram/id389801252
[https://perma.cc/UW8S-3EXR].
139. Toshiba 32LF221U21 31.5-inch HD Smart 720p TV - Fire TV, Released 2020, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/All-New-Toshiba-32LF221U21-32-inch-Smart/dp/B0872FYTWS [https://
perma.cc/BN64-UNZZ].
140. Id.
141. Id.
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essence of the company’s product.142 Tripadvisor advertises itself as the
ultimate travel companion based on “more than 1 billion reviews and
opinions of nearly 8 million businesses.”143 Tripadvisor has built a now
multi-billion dollar company through an “ever-growing army of
contributors who provide their services for free.”144 Tripadvisor’s
digital laborers, this “army of contributors,” provide the information
that is Tripadvisor’s product.
2. Data Creation. Data creation is another major way in which
digital laborers create a product that companies are then able to
monetize. This data creation is massive and growing exponentially. In
2013, the accumulated amount of data across the globe was 4.4
zettabytes, a number that was projected to be forty-four zettabytes in
2020.145 By 2025, it is projected that 0.463 zettabytes of data will be
created every day.146 Even though the collection and monetization of
data was initially within the purview of online platforms and other tech
companies, other industries are becoming increasingly aware of the
value of customer data and incorporating this data awareness into their
businesses.147
Digital laborers create data in a variety of ways.148 When a digital
laborer uploads content, they create data. When a digital laborer inputs
personal information into a website or runs an online search, they
create data. They create data in their physical and virtual movements

142. See About Tripadvisor, TRIPADVISOR, https://tripadvisor.mediaroom.com/us-about-us
[https://perma.cc/FEG7-MQYX]; Fast Facts, YELP, https://www.yelp-press.com/company/fastfacts/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/CB8X-PXFG].
143. TRIPADVISOR, supra note 142.
144. Linda Kinstler, How TripAdvisor Changed Travel, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2018, 1:00
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/17/how-tripadvisor-changed-travel [https://
perma.cc/R5DU-WXWB].
145. Desjardins, supra note 11. A zettabyte is one trillion gigabytes.
146. Id.
147. See generally DELOITTE, DATA VALUATION: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF YOUR
DATA ASSETS (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Finance/
Valuation-Data-Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG4Z-7RPF] (providing a guide for businesses in
various sectors to recognize and harness the value of their data).
148. See, e.g., OECD, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 55–56 (discussing various levels of
user participation on digital platforms); WORLD ECON. F., PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE
OF A NEW ASSET CLASS 7 (2011), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalData
NewAsset_Report_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZK5-4DBJ] (dividing data creation into data
volunteered by people, observed based on their actions, and inferred through analysis of
volunteered and observed data).
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and in their interactions with objects, spaces, and one another. These
multifarious forms of data creation are discussed in more detail below.
Each of these forms is united by the fact that it can be viewed as an act
of labor, creating an asset that companies then monetize.149
When digital laborers create content, they also create data. This
data is about both the producer of that content themselves as well as
about the people with whom they interact. If, for example, a digital
laborer posts photographs on a social media platform from a recent
hiking trip with friends, that laborer has provided the platform with a
variety of data, including their interest in the outdoors and physical
activity, their geographic orbit, and their social interactions. Or, if
digital laborers “share” news articles on political issues, their acts
create data on their political leanings, particularly if they also post
commentary on articles when sharing them.
When digital laborers write online reviews, they also produce data
for the online platform. By writing reviews in an online marketplace
through which they have made purchases, digital laborers supplement
the data created by their purchase records by highlighting which
products or services they are most interested in as well as their
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with each. Online reviews also create data
on the digital laborers’ interests. If, for example, digital laborers
regularly post Amazon reviews on photography equipment they
purchase but do not post reviews on household items they purchase,
this creates data suggesting a particular interest in photography.
Digital laborers also create data for companies by directly
inputting information about themselves or those around them—this
occurs in the context of online platforms as well as other consumerfacing businesses. When new digital laborers join Facebook, for
example, they are required to input their first and last names, phone
numbers or email addresses, birthdays, and gender identities. Once
digital laborers have created their new Facebook accounts, they can
149. Data that is volunteered or intentionally created by digital laborers, such as the input of
personal information or uploading content, can perhaps more readily be viewed as their “work”
than data that digital laborers create through their movements and interactions with the world
and others. In the first instance, as discussed in more detail below, digital laborers create data for
companies through active and targeted efforts. In contrast, digital laborers do not make any
targeted efforts to produce data that stems from their movements and interactions. Digital
laborers instead engage in routine activities and interactions, and those activities and interactions
result in data. One could argue that, because there is not an intentional effort by the digital laborer
to create something, digital laborers are not “working” in the case of this latter form of data
creation. This Article disagrees with this view. For further discussions of the phenomenon of data
as a product of labor, see supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
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add a variety of additional information as part of their profiles—the
places they have lived, the schools they have attended, their
workplaces, their political views, et cetera. E-commerce purchases
likewise require customers to provide various personal data to
companies, in contrast to most brick-and-mortar purchases.
When digital laborers enter search terms into search engines, such
as Google, or online marketplaces, such as Amazon or Airbnb, they
are effectively creating a log of their interests, preferences, and
characteristics through their active efforts. This log is a valuable source
of data on the digital laborer for the company. Take, for example, a
Google digital laborer who runs the following searches—“European
vacation ideas,” “best website for flight and hotel deals,” and “sample
European travel itineraries.” This log of activity produces data for
Google indicating that the laborer is planning a vacation to Europe.
The amount of data created on search engines is vast—3.5 billion
searches are run on Google every day.150
Digital laborers also produce data through activities and
interactions that are observed and monitored by companies. The
monitoring and observation of digital laborers can take many forms.151
First, digital laborers can be followed in their movements across digital
spaces. The development of the quickly ubiquitous “cookie” in the
1990s opened the door for the tracking and collection of data produced
by digital laborers as they move between various websites and
platforms, leaving a trail of “digital breadcrumbs.”152 Surveillance
technology has grown since that time, and companies are able to
monitor a digital laborer’s scrolling, clicking, and hovering in a given
session. Google, for example, can track which links digital laborers
follow within their search results and which search result previews
digital laborers pause to read rather than scroll past.153 Companies can
track the length of time that a digital laborer is engaged with the
platform.154 Facebook reported in 2016 that the average user spends

150. Marr, supra note 9.
151. For a thorough and critical analysis of corporate monitoring and observation of
customers, see generally ZUBOFF, supra note 19.
152. COHEN, supra note 5, at 54–59.
153. See Chris Crum, Google Eyes Mouse Movement as Possible Search Relevancy Signal,
WEBPRONEWS (July 13, 2010), https://www.webpronews.com/google-eyes-mouse-movement-aspossible-search-relevancy-signal [https://perma.cc/4X3U-UZJF].
154. See, e.g., Facebook (FB) Mark Elliot Zuckerberg on Q1 2016 Results - Earnings Call
Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 27, 2016, 6:29 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/3968783-
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about fifty minutes per day on Facebook, Instagram, or Facebook’s
Messenger platforms.155 Smartphone use has opened further
opportunities for data creation as digital laborers create data not only
through website browsing but also through texting and using apps to
manage their personal finance, fitness goals, and more.156
The rise of the Internet of Things (“IoT”) is fueling a further
expansion of this type of data creation.157 Ranging from smart cars to
wearable fitness trackers to smart refrigerators, sensors imbedded in
various products are already expanding (and have the potential to even
further expand) the level of data created by digital laborers.158
Applications on smartphones, for example, can track a digital laborer’s
physical location—either at all times or while the digital laborer is using
the application.159 A smart refrigerator can track brand choice, food
consumption patterns, and when items need replacing—interactions
with one’s refrigerator become an act of data creation.160
C. How Firms Monetize Digital Laborers’ Work
Firms translate the content and data created through the work of
digital laborers into revenues in a variety of ways. This Section
describes several of the most prominent ways that firms directly and
currently monetize digital laborers’ work161: (1) the sale and license of
user data, (2) revenues from online advertising, (3) services fees paid

facebook-fb-mark-elliot-zuckerberg-on-q1-2016-results-earnings-call-transcript [https://perma.cc/PZN3ML22] (reporting the average length of user sessions across platforms); Facebook’s (FB) CEO
Mark Zuckerberg on Q3 2014 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 28, 2014,
5:14 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/2607755-facebooks-fb-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-on-q32014-results-earnings-call-transcript [https://perma.cc/6MG3-YKLD] (reporting average length
of user sessions on Instagram).
155. James B. Stewart, Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bends-therules-of-audience-engagement-to-its-advantage.html [https://perma.cc/UPQ9-XZHW].
156. COHEN, supra note 5, at 57.
157. The IoT refers to the connection via the internet of computing devices within objects,
such as phones or cars, that allow those objects to send and receive data.
158. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 58.
159. Id. at 57–58.
160. Jathan Sadowski, When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction, 6
BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 6–7 (2019).
161. This Section is not intended to be an exhaustive description of the ways in which all firms
monetize content and data creation of digital laborers, nor would it be possible to write such a
description because firms’ business practices and their exact means of revenue creation are not
necessarily disclosed publicly.
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by third-party vendors or hosts on online marketplace platforms, and
(4) subscription services fees paid by platform users. As discussed
above, this Article only considers ways in which digital firms’ revenues
can be directly traced to digital laborers’ content and data creation. It
does not address value created indirectly by digital laborers, such as
value created through network effects or through a firm’s internal use
of digital laborers’ data for purposes such as improving efficiency or
developing new products.162
1. Direct Sale or License of User Data. The most straightforward
way that companies can monetize digital laborers’ work is by directly
selling or licensing digital-laborer-created data to third parties.163 This
practice is widespread, as indicated by a data brokerage industry that
is estimated at $200 billion.164 For example, Yelp might be able to
predict food trends based on data gathered from its digital laborers that
it can then sell to data and analytics businesses that advise companies
on business strategies.165 Data generated by digital laborers can also be
sold or licensed to third parties for purposes such as training machine
learning systems and developing artificial intelligence technologies.166
Digital laborers’ creation of data, therefore, generates current
revenues for companies by creating a product that the company can
directly sell or license.

162. See supra note 115.
163. See, e.g., Michael Latzer, Katharina Hollnbuchner, Natascha Just & Florian Saurwein,
Chapter 19: The Economics of Algorithmic Selection on the Internet, in HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 395, 413 (Johannes M. Bauer & Michael Latzer eds., 2018)
(“Today, personal data has become the new oil for the economy and [the] operators of algorithmic
selection applications are major collectors of such data online. They use these data to customize
services and monetize them (as an exchange for other/more data or by selling them directly) . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Michael Luca, Chapter 12: User-Generated Content and Social Media, in
HANDBOOK OF MEDIA ECONOMICS 564, 585 (Simon P. Anderson, David Strömberg & Joel
Waldfogel eds., 2016) (explaining that the sale of analytics and data is a primary means of revenue
generation from user-generated content); COLLIN & COLIN, supra note 62, at 2 (noting that digital
companies are able to earn revenue through the licensing of free user-generated data to third
parties).
164. Catherine Tucker & Nico Neumann, Buying Consumer Data? Tread Carefully, HARV.
BUS. REV. (May 1, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/buying-consumer-data-tread-carefully [https://
perma.cc/C4GK-YLB9].
165. Luca, supra note 163, at 585.
166. POSNER & WEYL, supra note 21, at 220 (describing digital companies as “data collectors,
delivering services that lure users into providing information on which they train AIs using ML”).
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2. Online Advertising Revenues. In the digital economy, social
media platforms, as well as other digital businesses, rely heavily, and in
some cases almost exclusively, on online advertising revenues. In its
2020 Form 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Facebook acknowledged, “We generate substantially all of our
revenue from selling advertising placements to marketers.”167 Indeed,
97.9 percent of Facebook’s revenue for 2020 came from advertising.168
Other digital companies outside the social media space likewise rely
heavily on advertising revenue. Tripadvisor also explained in its 2019
10-K filing, “We derive a substantial portion of our revenue from the
sale of advertising . . . .”169
Both content and data creation by digital laborers contribute to
online advertising revenue. As discussed in Part II.A above, in many
digital business models, digital laborers create entertainment and
information content that the business then disseminates to consumers.
This entertainment and information content draws “eyeballs” to the
platform, and digital laborers’ work to create it contributes to the sale
of online advertising. Because content generated by digital laborers
draws users and enables companies to provide advertising services, the
revenues earned by online platforms from advertising are attributable
(at least partly) to the labor of digital laborers when they generate
content.170
In the case of targeted advertising, data creation is an essential
component of the advertising service. It is an essential component
because data created by digital laborers allows this advertising to be
tailored and targeted toward individual users, rather than disseminated
167. Facebook 2020 Form 10-K, supra note 13, at 7.
168. Id. at 52.
169. Tripadvisor, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 22, 2019). Note that Tripadvisor
does not disaggregate advertising revenue in its annual financial reporting so the exact percentage
of Tripadvisor’s revenue that is derived from advertising is unknown.
170. The content created by digital laborers is an important factor in facilitating advertising
services for many online platforms, but it is not the only factor. The design, creation, and
maintenance of the platform itself, the activities of the digital company’s employees in soliciting
and effecting the advertising contracts, and the equipment, such as servers, used to host the
platform also contribute to creating advertising revenue. As is discussed in more detail in Part
III.A below, U.S. tax law has recognized this in the context of advertising income and allows
income from advertising, as well as services income more generally, to be allocated between
multiple activities and factors. See generally Piedras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm’r, 43 B.T.A. 297,
312 (1941), aff’d, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942) (“Certainly labor and personal services, both in the
radio programs themselves and in the operation of the power station or broadcasting plant,
contributed in a major degree to the dissemination of the advertising.”).
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to a more general audience.171 In contrast, in traditional advertising,
advertisements are targeted toward broad categories of people and
might be tailored based on the overall characteristics, but not
individual characteristics, of the audience. Commercials aired during a
sports event, for example, might be for products more appealing to
men because men constitute a disproportionate portion of the audience
for sports events.172 Targeting advertisements toward individuals
enables platforms to charge higher prices than can be charged for more
traditional advertising.173 A prime-time television advertisement might
typically bring revenues of ten dollars per thousand impressions, but a
targeted advertisement displayed following a search in a search engine
might typically bring revenues closer to one hundred dollars per
thousand impressions.174
While online advertising is expected to grow at a compound
annual growth rate of 16 percent from 2019 to 2024, offline advertising
is expected to decline.175 The data created by digital laborers is the
essential component that allows online platforms to offer and generate
revenues through targeted advertising,176 and the importance of online

171.

See Wenjuan Ma & Steven S. Wildman, Online Advertising Economics, in HANDBOOK
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET, supra note 163, at 426, 430–32 (describing targeted
advertising on online platforms).
172. For example, 68 percent of viewers for the 2012–13 National Hockey League regular
season were men. NIELSEN CO., YEAR IN SPORTS MEDIA REPORT 13 (2013), https://www.niel
sen.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/04/year-in-sports-media-report-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5JG8-DA8B].
173. See, e.g., HOWARD BEALES, NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, THE VALUE OF
BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 8 (2010) (finding that the price of behaviorally targeted advertising
was 2.68 times more than traditional advertising); Jianqing Chen & Jan Stallaert, An Economic
Analysis of Online Advertising Using Behavioral Targeting, 38 MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q. 429, 429
(2014) (finding that revenue from online advertising revenue can double with targeted behavioral
advertising versus traditional advertising while also citing factors such as degree of competition
that mitigates this effect). There is also evidence that the use of targeted advertising by online
platforms is driving down the price that offline media is able to charge for advertising. Martin
Peitz & Markus Reisinger, The Economics of Internet Media, in HANDBOOK OF MEDIA
ECONOMICS, supra note 163, at 445, 499–503.
174. Hal R. Varian, The Economics of Internet Search, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF THE INTERNET, supra note 163, at 385, 385.
175. How Has the U.S. Online Advertising Market Grown, and What’s the Forecast over the
Next 5 Years?, FORBES (June 11, 2019, 10:45 AM) [hereinafter How Has the U.S. Online
Advertising Market Grown], https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/06/11/how-hasthe-u-s-online-advertising-market-grown-and-whats-the-forecast-over-the-next-5-years/#4167ea
166607 [https://perma.cc/WU6S-37KV].
176. See, e.g., Ma & Wildman, supra note 171, at 426, 430–32 (describing how information
from the tracking of individual users is used to develop targeted advertising); How Has the U.S.
ON THE
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advertising is only expected to grow. Revenues from targeted
advertising services are at least partly attributable to digital laborers’
work creating data. The sale of advertising services, particularly
targeted advertising services, is a key way in which digital enterprises
monetize digital laborers’ work.
3. Services Fees on Online Marketplaces. One way in which online
marketplace platforms, such as Amazon, Apple’s AppStore, and
Airbnb, produce revenues is through fees that the firms charge thirdparty sellers, application developers, and property owners for the
ability to list or provide their products or services via the platform. As
discussed in more detail in the examples below, these fees are related
to the firm’s provision of a range of services to third parties. One of
these services is the sales force role that digital laborers play when
posting reviews and ratings and answering questions about the listed
products and services.
Amazon, for example, charges third-party vendors fees in
exchange for various services that Amazon provides to facilitate the
vendors’ sales of products to customers—these fees typically range
from 8 percent to 15 percent of sales revenue but can reach percentages
as high as 50.177 Amazon provides sellers with a myriad of services—
from being able to list their products on the Amazon website to
processing orders and payments to handling shipping and refunds.178
Part of the services that Amazon provides are the reviews and
questions and answers content created by Amazon’s digital laborers. A
portion of the revenue Amazon receives from third-party vendors,
therefore, is attributable to the work of these digital laborers.
Likewise, Airbnb charges hosts a fee equal to a percentage of
revenues to list their properties on the platform.179 A component of the
services that these hosts are paying Airbnb for, in addition to services
like payment processing, are digital laborers’ reviews and ratings that

Online Advertising Market Grown, supra note 175 (predicting an increase in the online advertising
market).
177. Angus Loten & Adam Janofsky, Sellers Need Amazon, but at What Cost?, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 14, 2011, 6:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sellers-need-amazon-but-at-what-cost1421278220 [https://perma.cc/M2TY-N4S5].
178. Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement, AMAZON, https://sellercentral.amazon.com/
gp/help/external/G1791 [https://perma.cc/F4JP-36J7].
179. Airbnb Service Fees, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/airbnb-servicefees [https://perma.cc/7FBL-ZVA9].
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legitimize their listings and thereby increase bookings. Apple similarly
monetizes the value created by the reviews and ratings of its digital
laborers by charging developers a fee to distribute their applications
via the App Store.180 This fee, which is either 15 or 30 percent of the
sales revenue that the developer receives through the App Store, is
paid in exchange for access to and various distribution and sales
services through the App Store—these services include the reviews and
ratings created by Apple’s digital laborers.181 These services fees are
another way in which digital enterprises monetize digital laborers’
work.
4. Subscription Services Fees. Digital companies also earn revenue
through subscription fees paid either by all users or by certain users to
access a premium level of service or a premium product. YouTube, for
example, offers users YouTube Premium. YouTube Premium is a
subscription service that allows YouTube viewers to watch videos
offline, play videos in the background, and watch videos without
advertisements for a monthly fee.182 YouTube users pay for this
premium service to more easily and conveniently access the content
created by YouTube’s digital laborers. Spotify likewise offers a
premium service that allows subscribers easier access to music content
through offline listening, ad-free listening, and other features for a
monthly fee.183 A portion of the content that Spotify subscribers pay a
monthly fee to access more easily is playlists created by digital laborers.
In both of these cases, a portion of the revenues from subscription
services fees is attributable to digital laborers’ work creating content
that premium subscribers are paying to access more easily.
D. Digital Laborers Compared to a Traditional Workforce
Digital laborers perform an equivalent function to a traditional
workforce—they are people producing goods and performing services
that companies then monetize. But a digital laborer’s relationship with
the companies for whom they produce data and content is not identical
to the traditional relationship between companies and members of
their workforces. These differences, however, do not outweigh the
180. Membership Details, APPLE DEV. PROGRAM, https://developer.apple.com/programs/
whats-included [https://perma.cc/T86M-AQ4X].
181. Id.
182. YouTube Premium, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/premium [https://perma.cc/
DRX3-QMRV].
183. Premium, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium [https://perma.cc/VE89-DU5E].
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similarities in the function that digital laborers and traditional
workforces play for companies. Nor do they negate the conceptual
legitimacy and necessity of treating them in the same way when
allocating taxing authority amongst jurisdictions.
Unlike a traditional employee or dependent agent of a firm, a
digital laborer is under no obligation to perform services or create
products for the firm. Digital laborers are typically not compensated
by the company (other than through the receipt of free services or
products). The firm has no management, supervision, or control over
the digital laborers’ work. These factors make the relationship between
digital laborers and firms distinct from the type that characterizes an
employer-employee or principal-agent relationship under current
concepts within U.S. and international tax law.184
While it is true that digital laborers do not match U.S. tax law’s
technical definition of an employee or an agent of a firm, these digital
laborers are serving the same economic function as a traditional
workforce.185 In their role as digital laborers, they are creating the
products and services that the firm then monetizes in its business. This
economic function makes their role more akin to that of a worker than
a customer, even taking into account the absence of obligations,
payments, and control. The increasing digitalization of the economy
and economic activities of digital laborers warrants stakeholders
revisiting the existing doctrine specifying that only persons who fall
under current limited definitions of employee or agent should be
considered members of a firm’s workforce for tax purposes. The
question should not be whether digital laborers meet a narrow,
traditional definition of employee or agent but whether they are closer
184. See, e.g., Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 535, 553–55 (1995)
(identifying external control as an important factor in determining whether an agent was
dependent or independent for purposes of the United States-Japan tax treaty); Rev. Rul. 87-41,
1981-1 C.B. 296 (identifying twenty common law factors that can be used to determine whether
an employer-employee relationship exists for employment tax purposes, including ability to
control and provide instructions, set hours of work, and regular payment based on time worked);
Rev. Rul. 74-330, 1974-2 C.B. 278 (explaining that control, contract, regular business activity, and
responsibility for performance are all factors indicating whether an employer-employee
relationship exists under the United States-United Kingdom tax treaty); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.,
1992 WL 1466020 (Mar. 20, 1992) (emphasizing the importance of the employer having a right to
control or direct the individual providing services in order to establish an employer-employee
relationship).
185. The social relationship between a company and a digital laborer is also of the same type
as the social relationship between a company and a traditional employee. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
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to a workforce than to a customer base. This new approach is an
important step in adapting the tax system to a changing economic
environment.
An argument against this new approach is that outside parties,
including customers, have historically produced value for companies in
similar ways to digital laborers and have not been treated as members
of companies’ workforces.186 Treating digital laborers in the same way
as a workforce while not recognizing similar relationships in other
industries would inappropriately treat the digital economy differently
from other segments of the economy.
It is true that customers and other third parties have historically
created economic gains for companies in various business models
outside the digital economy. For instance, Professor Itai Grinberg
describes the example of participants in a clinical trial who are given
drugs in exchange for the provision of personal health data to the
company, which is then monetized by the company through the sale of
products.187 These participants are not treated in the same way as
employees of the company for tax purposes. He argues that “it does
not seem intellectually defensible to suggest that users only
meaningfully contribute to value creation in the context of certain
digital platforms” and rejects the concept of taxing value created by
users generally.188 Other examples of outside parties producing value
for firms exist across various industries. A customer at a clothing store
could function in the role that is traditionally filled by a salesperson if
they tell another customer that they found a pair of shoes to be
particularly comfortable, in the same way that an Amazon user fulfills
this salesperson role through online reviews.
The observation that customers have historically created value for
companies outside of payment for products and services does not
invalidate the conceptual legitimacy of recognizing the similar function
that digital laborers play to a workforce and treating them as such when
sourcing income attributable to their work. The economy is complex,
and the nature of economic activities is multifarious. Because of this
complexity, the treatment of economic activities under our tax systems
inevitably contains “holes” in which certain types of economic

186. Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the
Current Debate, 45 INT’L TAX J. 39, 47–49 (2019) (arguing that users create value in contexts other
than digital platforms, thus making user participation programs theoretically weak).
187. Id. at 48.
188. Id. at 49.
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activities are unaccounted for or mischaracterized. This failure to take
into account customers’ roles as producers, both in the context of the
data and content creation of digital laborers and in the types of
business activities discussed above, is such a hole. With the increasing
digitalization of the economy and the accompanying importance of
digital laborers’ production, this hole has grown larger, prompting a
need to reevaluate the role that these value-producing customers and
third parties play for firms and to revise the doctrine surrounding the
categorization of labor for tax purposes. This reevaluation should not
necessarily be limited only to the role of producer occupied by digital
laborers creating content and data. For example, participants in clinical
trials could also be treated in the same manner as traditional members
of pharmaceutical companies’ workforces when sourcing income.
Another difference between digital laborers and traditional
members of firms’ workforces is the de minimis nature of the economic
gains created by any single digital laborer. As compared to the
economic contributions that a traditional worker makes to a company,
the contribution of any single digital laborer is small. For example,
Facebook earned an average of only $9.27 in revenues per user in the
first quarter of 2021.189 In the case of Facebook, a relatively high
proportion of Facebook’s revenues can be attributed to the labor of
digital workers because of the extent to which digital laborers’ content
and data creation facilitate advertising revenue, which makes up the
vast majority of Facebook’s total revenues.190 In business models like
that of Amazon or Spotify, a smaller proportion of the company’s
economic gains are attributable to digital laborers’ work because the
services such laborers provide are a smaller component of the package
of services the company offers to consumers.191 It is, therefore, true that
the economic value produced by any single digital laborer in both of
these business models is often de minimis. However, when the
economic contributions of all digital laborers in a given country are
aggregated together, these contributions are not de minimis. When
considering whether digital laborers serve a similar role to a workforce,
the aggregate value that digital laborers add, not the value added by
individual laborers, is the appropriate measure to consider. The de
189. FACEBOOK, supra note 6, at 4.
190. See Facebook 2020 Form 10-K, supra note 13, at 7 (reporting that 97.9 percent of
Facebook’s revenue was derived from advertising); Ma & Wildman, supra note 171, at 426, 430–
32 (describing how user data facilitates targeted advertising).
191. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (describing the services offered by
Amazon); supra notes 135, 183 and accompanying text (describing services offered by Spotify).
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minimis nature of any individual digital laborers’ contribution does not
invalidate treating digital laborers in the same way as an enterprise’s
workforce when sourcing income associated with their work.
The above discussion demonstrates that, while digital labor and
the relationship between digital laborers and companies possess
unique features, digital laborers fulfill a similar role to a traditional
workforce when creating content and data for companies. Treating
them in the same way as a traditional workforce for purposes of
allocating taxing authority over income attributable to their work is
appropriate to maintain coherence in the international tax system. If
digital laborers are not treated in the same way as a workforce, tax law
ring-fences certain types of digital business models by taxing equivalent
economic activities differently. Part III applies this framework of
digital laborers as a type of workforce to current U.S. international tax
law.
III. DIGITAL LABORERS’ WORK AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION
As Part II demonstrates, digital laborers fulfill a similar function
as a traditional workforce but do so in a novel and unfamiliar way. As
with any novel economic activity, the rise of digital laborers presents
challenges when trying to situate income attributable to digital
laborers’ activities into existing tax law. U.S. tax law has historically
dealt with the issue of novel economic activities or transactions by
analogizing such activities or transactions to those established activities
and transactions that most closely mirror those that have recently
developed.192 By analogizing to the old, the preexisting case law and
administrative analyses can guide the appropriate treatment of the
novel. For example, in August of 2019, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) issued proposed regulations to address the tax treatment of
transfers of digital content, such as books or movies in digital format, a
type of economic transaction that has become increasingly prevalent in
recent years.193 The IRS chose to address these transactions in the

192. See PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, DAVID L. CAMERON & THOMAS KITTLE-KAMP,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES & INTANGIBLE ASSETS ¶ 14.02[1]
(2019) (“Categories of income not expressly addressed by a particular sourcing rule are sourced
administratively or judicially, often with reference to the statutory rule that is most congruous
with the transaction or income type under consideration.”).
193. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18, 84 Fed. Reg. 40,317 (Aug. 14, 2019).
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proposed regulations by incorporating the standards of preexisting
regulations that apply to the tax treatment of transfers of computer
programs.194
It is, therefore, consistent with past practice to treat the activities
of digital laborers in the same manner as the work of traditional
employees to determine the source of a firm’s income. This Part
demonstrates that, once digital laborers are treated in the same way as
a traditional workforce, their home countries are in most instances the
source countries for income attributable to their work under the
current approach of U.S. international tax law.
This Part first applies the U.S. statutory source rules to income
stemming from digital laborers’ work using the framework of digital
laborers as a type of workforce. It demonstrates that these rules dictate
that, in most circumstances, the income stemming from the digital
laborers’ activities should be sourced to their home countries. These
source rules express the United States’ view of when the source
principle applies to grant a jurisdiction taxing authority over gains from
certain economic activities. This outcome demonstrates that allocating
taxing authority to digital laborers’ home countries is a natural and
appropriate extension of the existing U.S. approach to source-based
taxation into a new economic environment. This Part then applies this
framework to U.S. bilateral tax treaties. It demonstrates that, once
digital laborers’ jurisdictions are considered the source jurisdictions
with respect to income attributable to their work, taxing authority can
be granted to such jurisdictions through a rebalancing of the claims of
the source and residence jurisdictions. If tax law reforms the doctrine
surrounding the distinction between workers and customers and the
meaning of a workforce, it becomes unnecessary to upend the source
principle and structure of the international tax system in order to grant
taxing authority to digital laborers’ jurisdictions.
A. Income from Services
Several categories of income that stem, at least partly, from the
work of digital laborers are services income under U.S. domestic tax
law. As explained below, once digital laborers are treated in the same
way as a firm’s workforce, the digital laborers’ home countries are the
source countries of the services income attributable to their work
194. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg.
40,317 (Aug. 14, 2019).
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under the U.S. statutory approach to determining source. These
categories include income from online advertising, income from fees
charged for access to online marketplaces, and subscription services
fees for online platforms, each of which are discussed in turn below.195
Income derived from the performance of services is generally
sourced to the place of performance of that service.196 The place of
performance is the place where people or capital are deployed to
perform the service.197 Neither the residence of the service provider,
the place where the contract for services is negotiated and executed,
nor the place where payment occurs or is directed is relevant for
determining the place of performance.198 This same scheme applies to
services performed by individuals and services performed by firms
through the activities of their employees or agents.199 For services
performed by multinational firms, it is often the case that payment for
services may be attributable to the work of people in multiple
jurisdictions. For example, an online platform might receive a single
payment from a third-party vendor in exchange for processing orders.
One component of order processing—managing payments—is
performed by members of the firm’s labor force located in the United
States while another component of order processing—fielding
customer service inquiries—is performed by members of the firm’s
labor force located in the Philippines. In these circumstances, the
services income from the third-party vendor’s payment would be
allocated partly to the United States and partly to the Philippines,

195. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but instead represents three major means by
which enterprises earn services income attributable in part to the work of digital laborers. The
analysis applied to these three categories of services income may apply to other ways in which
enterprises monetize digital laborers’ work.
196. I.R.C. § 861(a)(3).
197. See Piedras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm’r, 43 B.T.A. 297, 312–13 (1941), aff’d, 127 F.2d
260 (5th Cir. 1942) (sourcing income from advertising services based on the locations of the
equipment and personnel used to perform the service).
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(a)(1) (1957).
199. Comm’r v. Hawaiian Philippine Co., 100 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1939) (discussing a prior
codification of I.R.C. § 861(a)(3) and concluding that “[t]he Commissioner has cited no authority
for the proposition . . . that a corporation cannot perform labor or personal services; and no
reason . . . why § 119(c)(3) was not intended to apply to corporations. Clearly the section . . . is
applicable to corporations. The 1928 act itself defines the term ‘person’ as including corporations”
(internal citations omitted)).
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based on the relative value of the services performed in each
jurisdiction.200
As discussed above, online advertising is a large revenue
generator for most digital companies. Advertising income is
considered services income under U.S. domestic tax law.201 Online
advertising income has been analogized to advertising income from
broadcast media, and the case law and administrative decisions
addressing the tax treatment of broadcast media’s advertising income
has been applied to online advertising.202
Case law and administrative decisions addressing the source of
broadcast advertising income focus on the location of the incomeproducing activity, not the location of the listeners or viewers who are
the audience for the advertisements or the location of the purchasers
of the advertisements. The seminal case in this area is Piedras Negras
Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner.203 The taxpayer in Piedras Negras
was a radio station located in Mexico near the U.S. border; it had a
large number of listeners based in the United States and received the
vast majority of advertising revenue from U.S. advertisers.204 The court
considered whether the United States was the source of the station’s
advertising income and, thus, should have taxing authority over such
income under the U.S. source rules.205 The court held that Mexico, not
the United States, was the source of the advertising income.206 The
court focused on the location of the property and activities that
facilitated the advertising, including the location where employees
created the station’s programming and the locations of the station’s
broadcasting equipment and other property necessary to air the
advertisements.207 The case law and rulings addressing which country

200. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1975). This relative value is assessed using
a facts and circumstances test. Id.
201. DAVID E. HARDESTY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION AND PLANNING
¶ 11B.03[5] (2019).
202. Id. ¶ 11B.03[5][b].
203. Piedras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm’r, 43 B.T.A. 297 (1941), aff’d, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir.
1942).
204. Id. at 303.
205. Id. at 303–04.
206. Id. at 313.
207. Id. at 312 (“Certainly labor and personal services, both in the radio programs themselves
and in the operation of the power station or broadcasting plant, contributed in a major degree to
the dissemination of the advertising. Such labor and personal services were wholly without the
United States.”).
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is the source jurisdiction for advertising income have continued to
follow the principle articulated in Piedras Negras that the locations of
the labor and property that are necessary to produce or facilitate the
production of advertising services are the dispositive factors in
determining source.208
If digital laborers are only considered in their role as a firm’s
consumers, their locations would be irrelevant for determining the
source of advertising income, like the listeners of the Piedras Negras
radio station. However, if digital laborers are considered in their role
as producers and treated in the same way as members of a firm’s
workforce, their home countries are the source countries for the
portion of the advertising income that is attributable to the relative
value of their activities in creating the revenue. These activities include
both their data and content creation.
As discussed above, online advertising is frequently targeted
advertising—advertising directed at specific viewers that is often sold
at higher prices than general advertising services.209 A digital enterprise
must undertake a variety of activities, such as soliciting and managing
contracts with advertisers, and employ various items of enterprise’s
property, such as servers, to provide advertising services, both targeted
and otherwise. Many of these activities are performed by the
enterprise’s traditional workforce. But digital laborers facilitate a key
component of targeted advertising services by creating the data that is
necessary to appropriately target the advertisements.
In some business models, such as social media firms, digital
laborers’ content production also facilitates the sale of online
advertising in the same way as Piedras Negras’s employees’ creation of
programming facilitated its sale of broadcast advertising. Digital
laborers’ content production serves the same function because their
content is the entertainment and essential product that draws the

208. For example, in British Timken Ltd. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 880 (1949), the Tax Court,
citing Piedras Negras, held that a foreign corporation’s income from sales activities was foreign
source because the situs of the corporation’s agents’ activities was outside the United States.
British Timken, 12 T.C. at 888. In a private letter ruling, the IRS considered a situation in which
a foreign corporation published and distributed a magazine outside the United States but received
advertising income from U.S. advertisers. The IRS ruled that the income from the U.S. advertisers
should be sourced to the foreign jurisdiction because the capital and labor used to publish and
distribute the magazine were located outside the United States. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6203055590A
(Mar. 5, 1962).
209. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
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audience to the platform. Under the standards of the U.S. statutory
source rules and case law, the services income from online advertising
should be allocated amongst the jurisdictions in which each component
of the advertising services is performed based on their relative values.
The location of digital laborers is one of these jurisdictions of
performance.
Online marketplaces, such as Amazon and Airbnb, earn revenue
both through online advertising and by providing online services to
third-party vendors.210 As discussed above,211 online marketplaces
charge third-party vendors, both companies and individuals, fees in
exchange for services provided to the vendors in order to facilitate their
sales of products to customers. One of these services is the sales
function provided by digital laborers when writing reviews, answering
questions, and directing buyers to certain products. Income from
facilitating sales or promoting another party’s products is typically
services income.212 Therefore, fees paid to online platforms create
services income, and the source of that services income is the place of
performance of those services. To the extent that this fee income is
attributable to the vendor’s payment for the sales or promotion
services of digital laborers, the source of that income should be the
digital laborers’ home countries, which is the location from which they
perform this sales function.

210. Online services can broadly be defined as services in which “a customer gains access to
some type of online functionality.” HARDESTY, supra note 201, ¶ 11B.02[5].
211. See supra Part II.C.3.
212. Characterizing these activities as services and sourcing the income to the place of
performance of these services is consistent with the U.S. statutory scheme as well as prior case
law. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(3); British Timken, 12 T.C. at 888 (sourcing sales commission income
to the jurisdiction in which the sales force provided services); Rev. Rul. 60-55, 1960-1 C.B. 270
(ruling that commissions received by a foreign corporation from a U.S. corporation for promotion
of products outside the United States was foreign-source income for services); KUNTZ & PERONI,
supra note 36, ¶ A2.03[6][e][i].
Recent administrative guidance also points toward classifying online marketplace fees as
services income. On August 14, 2019, the Department of the Treasury proposed new regulations
addressing the classification of cloud transactions. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-19, 84 Fed. Reg.
40,317, 40,319 (Aug. 14, 2019). The proposed regulations incorporate the factors listed in
§ 7701(e)(1) to guide the determination of whether a cloud transaction should be characterized
as a services transaction or a lease and include various examples of cloud computing transactions,
all of which are classified as services contracts rather than leases. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.86119(c)(2), (d), 84 Fed. Reg. 40,317, 40,326–29 (Aug. 14, 2019). Although fees charged by online
marketplaces were not incorporated into the regulations, the proposed regulations’ trend toward
classifying cloud transactions as services further supports the conclusion that online marketplace
fee income is services income.
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Subscription services fees are another category of income which
digital platforms receive in exchange for services provided to their
consumers; these services might include the ability to stream music or
videos and or to have access to crafted playlists.213 A component of
these services is often provided by the work of platforms’ users in their
role as digital laborers. For example, digital laborers often provide the
content for media hosting platforms or craft playlists that other users
can access on music streaming services. Digital laborers perform a
portion of the services that subscribers pay for. As a result, the portion
of the subscription services fees that are attributable to the digital
laborers’ services should be sourced to their home countries under the
principles of U.S. statutory source rules once they are treated in the
same way as members of a company’s workforce, rather than merely
as consumers.
B. Income from the Sale or License of Data
One of the ways that companies monetize digital laborers’ data is
through the sale of data to third parties. A digital laborer’s production
of that data for eventual sale by the company is analogous to a
traditional manufacturing worker creating a product or a component
of a product. The difference between production of a physical product
and data production is the setting. In traditional manufacturing, the
work occurs in a discrete physical space. A worker enters a firm’s
factory and creates a widget through their labor, which is then sold to
a consumer (or creates a component of a widget which is combined
with other components to create a final product that is sold to a
consumer). In data manufacturing, there is no discrete physical space
in which the digital laborer must be to work. All of a digital laborers’
movements, activities, and interactions, both in the world and through
online platforms, have the potential to create data for the company.
The factory is wherever the digital laborer is located. This raw data may
be the final product sold to the consumer, or the company may analyze

213. See supra Part II.C.4. In certain circumstances, subscription services fees might more
properly be categorized as a sale or license of a digital product rather than as a service. For
example, the proposed cloud computing regulations differentiate between subscription fees paid
for the ability to stream digital content without the right to download, which are categorized as
services income, and fees paid for the ability to stream and download digital content, which are
categorized as sales or leases depending on the terms of the subscription. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.861-19(d)(9), (11), 84 Fed. Reg. 40,317, 40,328–29 (Aug. 14, 2019). This analysis focuses on
subscription services fees that constitute services income.

PARSONS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

TAX’S DIGITAL LABOR DILEMMA

4/16/2022 6:42 PM

1837

and package the data prior to sale to a consumer.214 As is explained
below, once data production by a digital laborer is properly treated as
a step in the manufacturing process that leads to the sale of inventory
property, it follows under U.S. source rules that a portion of the sales
income should be sourced to the “place of production” of the raw data
by the digital laborer, the location from which the digital laborer
performed the activities that created the data. This location will most
commonly be the digital laborer’s home country.215
Under the U.S. statutory source rules, the source of income from
the sale of inventory that is produced by a taxpayer is the place of
production of the inventory property.216 Allocating income from the
214. Some might argue that raw data created by the digital laborer is valueless until it is
analyzed by a firm’s algorithm, and, therefore, digital laborers create nothing of value to tax. This
argument has a couple of key weaknesses. First, raw user data can be sold to third parties, who
then process and analyze the data, demonstrating that user data alone does have independent
value. Second, under this argument, many components of final products that are created at
intermediate stages of the manufacturing process can be said to lack value. But current U.S. tax
law acknowledges the value of intermediate products. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 47.2.1 (2019) (ebook) (“[A]
manufacturer’s raw materials and work in process are inventory property, even though not held
for sale to customers.”). Under the U.S. transfer pricing rules, if an intermediate component
created in the manufacturing process is transferred from one affiliate to another, the transfer is
treated as an arm’s length transaction between unrelated parties, and value is assigned to the
intermediate component. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(C) (example 3) (1994) (providing
an example in which small motors manufactured by one affiliate were sold to the parent company
and incorporated into a final product for sale to consumers and value was allocated to the
component motors).
215. Although this author believes that data sold to third parties should properly be
characterized as inventory property for tax purposes, this characterization is not completely clear
under current law. This ambiguity derives from the unique nature of data as an asset—in
particular, its nonrivalrous nature. The same piece of data can be used by different parties for
different purposes without reducing its value. This stands in contrast to a widget, which can only
be used by one party at a time. Because it can be used by multiple parties, a company could both
sell data to a third party and use that same data internally to develop new products and services.
The Code defines inventory property as “property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.” I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (emphasis added);
see I.R.C. § 865(i)(1) (defining inventory property by referencing § 1221(a)(1)). Because it is used
for multiple purposes, it could be argued that data is not held primarily for the sale to customers
when the company uses it internally in addition to selling it. This uncertainty highlights the
challenges that data as an asset presents to tax law’s system of categorizing income and property
and is a rich topic for future research.
216. I.R.C. § 863(b) (sourcing inventory property produced by taxpayer to the place of
production); id. § 865(b) (exempting inventory property from the general rule that gains from the
sale of personal property are sourced to the jurisdiction of the taxpayer); id. § 865(i)(1) (defining
inventory property for purposes of § 865 by reference to § 1221(a)(1)); id. § 1221(a)(1) (defining
inventory property as “property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of
the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily
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sale of taxpayer-produced inventory property solely to the place of
production is a legislative change that was part of the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017.217 Under prior law, income was divided between the
place of production and the place of sale.218 Congress’s determination
that the place of production should be the sole basis on which this type
of income should be allocated indicates congressional belief that place
of production is a key factor in allocating income between jurisdictions.
The place of production is determined based on the location of
“production assets,” meaning the taxpayer’s tangible and intangible
assets that are used to produce the relevant inventory.219 The place of
production of digital laborers’ data is, therefore, determined based on
the location of the production assets that digital laborers use to create
the data. In the case of digital laborers, these data production assets
could include the physical vehicles through which laborers conduct the
activities that produce data, such as mobile devices, tablets, and
computers; the IoT devices that monitor their interactions and
activities, such as smart cars; and the virtual platforms on which they
work. Assets such as computers, mobile devices, and smart objects are
not technically owned by the taxpayer (the company)—they are owned
by the digital laborers themselves.
This is a circumstance, however, in which the recognition of the
role of customers and users as both consumers and producers leads to
the need to reframe and adapt current law to accommodate new
economic circumstances and make the tax treatment of new business
models congruous with tax treatment of traditional business models.
To the extent that customers and users function as producers and exist
inside the firm for tax purposes, it is a logical step that the devices
through which they produce data for the company should be
considered property of the company when determining the place of
production. This reframing leads to the result that the digital laborers’

for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business”); see BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 214, ¶ 47.2.1.
217. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 14303, 131 Stat. 2054, 2225
(adding to § 863(b) that income from the sale or exchange of inventory property shall be allocated
solely on the basis of production activities).
218. I.R.C. § 863(b) (2012) (amended 2017).
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c)(1)(i) (2020). When production activities occur both inside and
outside the United States, the source rules allocate income based on the relative value of the
production assets located inside and outside the United States. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c)(1)(ii)
(2020).
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home countries should be the source of a portion of the sales income
from the sale of data they create under the existing principles of U.S.
tax law because they are the places of production of that property.
Depending on the terms of the transaction transferring data from
a company to a third party, the transaction might be treated as a license
of the data rather than a sale.220 For example, the transfer of an
exclusive right to use and exploit an asset comprises a sale for tax
purposes while a transfer of a limited right comprises a license.221
Information on the exact terms of transactions relating to data sales is
not generally publicly available, and it is possible that many of these
“sales” are actually licenses under U.S. tax law. If a transfer of data is
treated as a license rather than a sale, the source of the income from
the license is the jurisdiction in which the data is or can be used by the
licensee.222 In the circumstance of a license of data produced by digital
laborers, the digital laborers’ home countries are not the source of
income from the license even if digital laborers are treated in the same
way as members of a company’s workforce. Granting the digital
laborer’s home country taxing rights over income from licensing data
would be a departure from the current application of the source
principle in the U.S. statutory source rules.223
C. U.S. Bilateral Treaties and Digital Laborers’ Work
The discussion above demonstrates that granting digital laborers’
home countries’ taxing authority would not be a departure from the
existing application of the source principle under U.S. domestic tax law
once they are treated in the same way as a firm’s workforce. But the
U.S. international tax system consists not only of domestic law but also
of a series of bilateral treaties.224 These bilateral treaties aim to avoid
double taxation by balancing the taxing rights of residence and source
countries. In balancing the source and residence country’s taxing rights,

220. For a discussion of how to distinguish between a sale and a lease or license for tax
purposes, see KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36, ¶ A2.03[7][d].
221. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 (transfer of exclusive right to use secret
formula treated as sale).
222. I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4).
223. Given the increasing importance of the data economy, the unique nature of data as an
asset, and the essential role of digital laborers in producing data, whether the source rules for
royalty income from data should be revised is a rich topic for debate.
224. Mason, supra note 36, at 355 (describing international tax regimes as a combination of
“domestic tax regimes and an extensive network of bilateral tax treaties to connect them”).
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tax treaties may grant a taxpayer’s residence country exclusive rights
to tax a particular item of income even if the other country is the source
country with respect to that income.225 Therefore, a digital laborer’s
home country being the source of income attributable to their work
only results in that country having taxing authority if a tax treaty does
not prevent the source-based taxation of that income.
Most tax treaties allow the source country to tax any business
profits that arise from activities within its jurisdiction but only to the
extent such activities are linked to a permanent establishment in the
country.226 This permanent establishment requirement is a mechanism
through which treaties limit the taxing rights of the source jurisdiction
with respect to business profits.227 Although the exact contours of the
permanent establishment requirement vary from treaty to treaty,
creating a permanent establishment typically requires the presence of
a place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, a
mine, a well or quarry, or any other fixed place of business through
which the enterprise’s business is carried on.228 The presence of
dependent agents of the company can also create a permanent
establishment.229 A dependent agent is a person acting on behalf of the
company that habitually concludes contracts on behalf of the
enterprise.230 Merely having a workforce in a country, therefore, does
not create a permanent establishment unless the workforce carries on
work in one of the establishments described above or another fixed
place of business or they are functioning as dependent agents who

225. See RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES
¶ 1.01[1][a](1) (2021) (ebook) (noting circumstances in which treaty provisions prevail over
domestic tax law, including domestic source rules).
226. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 38, at art. 7, ¶ 1. This discussion is based
on the specific requirements of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which is the most common
model followed by U.S. income tax treaties. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. For a
thorough analysis of the permanent establishment clause over all U.S. income tax treaties, see
generally J. Ross Macdonald, “Songs of Innocence and Experience”: Changes to the Scope and
Interpretation of the Permanent Establishment Article in U.S. Income Tax Treaties, 1950–2010, 63
TAX LAW. 285 (2010).
227. ANDERSEN, supra note 225, ¶ 3.01[1] (explaining that business profits derived from
economic activities in the source country cannot be taxed by that country unless those activities
are attributable to a permanent establishment).
228. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 38, at art. 5, ¶¶ 1–2.
229. See id. at art. 5, ¶¶ 5–6.
230. See id.
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habitually conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise.231 The
permanent establishment requirement is a legacy of the 1920s League
of Nations model tax treaty negotiations.232 At that time, there was
both intense concern about double taxation and instances of countries
trying to assert taxing authority when only minimal economic activities
were seen in the jurisdiction.233 The permanent establishment
requirement provided a backstop against those practices.
Therefore, even if digital laborers are treated in the same way as
members of a company’s workforce, their home countries would not
be able to tax business profits associated with their work under the U.S.
international tax system if the permanent establishment clause remains
a feature of U.S. bilateral treaties and continues to be interpreted in
the same fashion. This is because the permanent establishment
requirement mandates a distinct physical space in which a workforce
gathers to perform economic activities on behalf of the company, such
as a factory or office,234 and digital laborers do not work in a distinct
physical space. U.S. bilateral treaties would need to be revised,
therefore, to provide that the presence of a workforce alone creates a
permanent establishment even in the absence of a physical
establishment, such as a factory or office.235 This reform would
constitute a rebalancing of the taxing rights of the source and residence
jurisdictions, rather than the creation of a new taxing right for the
market jurisdiction, and would represent a smaller and more
incremental reform than existing proposals. It would also lend
uniformity to the U.S. international tax system by treating similar types
of production in the same manner under U.S. international tax law
regardless of the setting in which the production occurs.
Recognizing the role that digital laborers play for companies and
treating them in the same way as members of a company’s workforce

231. See ANDERSEN, supra note 225, ¶ 3.02[3][b][i] (explaining that the presence of
employees who are not dependent agents will only result in the creation of a permanent
establishment if they work at a fixed place of business).
232. See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 37, at 1088–89.
233. Id. at 1087–88.
234. Or the presence of dependent agents in the jurisdiction who habitually conclude
contracts on behalf of the company.
235. Alternatively, in the same way that U.S. stakeholders should reconceive the nature of
manufacturing activities and the meaning of productions assets under U.S. domestic law in order
to bring that law in line with the modern economy, U.S. and international stakeholders could
consider revising their interpretations of the permanent establishment clause to adjust to the
changing nature of economic activities and view any location in which a digital laborer is
performing “work” for a company through content or data creation to be an office or factory.
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allows their jurisdictions to tax income attributable to their work under
the source principle as it is currently applied. This paves the way for
these jurisdictions to tax companies for whom digital laborers work
through much smaller changes to the U.S. international tax system,
thus providing taxpayers with more continuity and certainty than more
radical overhauls. The following Part addresses questions of
administrability and implementation.
IV. ADMINISTRABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Article focuses on the conceptual legitimacy of treating
digital laborers in the same way as a traditional workforce for tax
purposes and allowing digital laborers’ home countries to tax income
associated with their work. In order for a tax system to be fair and
equitable, it must be administrable as well as theoretically coherent.236
This Part discusses potential barriers to administration of the reforms
proposed by this Article. All of these barriers stem from the question
of how companies and taxing authorities quantify the relative
contribution of digital laborers’ content and data creation to the
creation of an item of income as compared to the relative contribution
of other business activities and assets of the company. It concludes that
none of these barriers is an insurmountable hurdle to effective
implementation. It further concludes that the more incremental reform
advocated by this Article is superior to other proposed reforms
because it provides consistency and continuity for taxpayers and taxing
authorities and applies uniformly across all multinational companies.
This proposal requires quantifying the aggregate contribution of
the data and content creation of all digital laborers within a given
jurisdiction to the creation of company income over the period of a
year.237 It is, therefore, not necessary to assess the relative contribution
of each individual digital laborer to the creation of income. The fact
that digital laborers’ contributions are aggregated tempers many of the
perceived barriers to accurate quantification. These include the varied
nature and extent of each digital laborer’s contribution, the de minimis
value of an individual digital laborer’s contribution to an item of
income, and the possibility of digital laborers creating data or content
across jurisdictional lines.

236. See Hammerl & Zechner, supra note 108, at 4 (discussing the potential inequities that
arise when a tax system is not administrable).
237. See I.R.C. § 6072(a) (requiring filing of income tax returns on an annual basis).
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Digital laborers’ contributions to an enterprise often vary. The
extent of content and data creation and associated revenues and
income produced by digital laborers’ activities can differ substantially
from one digital laborer to another. One digital laborer might create
daily content posts for a social media platform, provide detailed
reviews on each product they purchase through online marketplaces,
or run dozens of searches on a search engine per day. Another digital
laborer might never write a social media post or online review and
might infrequently use search engines. The amount and value of work
of a single digital laborer might also vary over time—the digital laborer
might cycle through phases of frequent content and data creation and
phases of limited creation.
Additionally, the amount of income that is attributable to the data
and content creation of an individual digital laborer is de minimis in
the context of a company’s total income.238 Digital laborers are likely
contributing to the income production of hundreds of companies in a
given year, particularly with respect to data creation. And the
jurisdiction in which a digital laborer initially creates data and content
might not match the jurisdiction in which the data and content are
uploaded, and thus can be measured, by a company. For example, an
Airbnb user on vacation in France might write a review of their
lodgings while still in France but not upload that content until returning
home to the United States. France is to a large extent the place of
performance of the digital laborers’ services, but it is not possible for
Airbnb or the French taxing authorities to discern that.
Each of these features of digital labor would a present major
administrative burden if treating digital laborers in the same way as a
traditional workforce required specifically measuring the relative
contribution of each act of data and content creation of each individual
laborer to an item of company income. Asking Google to determine
how much the data stemming from a single search of a single digital
laborer contributed to the creation of its targeted advertising income
would be an overly burdensome task. But because treating digital
laborers in the same way as a traditional workforce only requires
discerning the aggregate contribution of all digital laborers within a
given jurisdiction, the impact of these variations is limited. Google
would instead be asked to determine how much the data stemming
from all of the searches of all digital laborers in Country A contributed
to the creation of targeted advertising income relative to other
238.

See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
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company activities and assets. As discussed in more detail below,
companies and taxing authorities should be able to create reasonably
accurate assessments of the digital laborers’ contribution under current
transfer pricing practices.
Even when measured in the aggregate across an entire
jurisdiction, assessing the relative value that digital laborers’ content
and data creation contributes to the creation of different categories of
income versus the value contributed by a firm’s traditional workforce
and assets is the key implementation challenge of this proposal. But,
while this challenge is significant, it is one that the international tax
system addresses regularly and with respect to which an abundance of
regulations, international guidelines, administrative decisions, and case
law exist. For example, in the context of the U.S. statutory source rules,
the rules allocate services income between U.S. and foreign
jurisdictions based on the relative value of the services performed in
the United States and abroad using a facts and circumstances test.239
The U.S. source rules determine that the place of production of
inventory property requires an assessment of the relative value of
production assets in U.S. and foreign jurisdictions.240 On both the
domestic and international levels, transfer pricing methodology has
developed over the course of decades.241 The U.S. transfer pricing rules
under § 482 of the Code,242 as well as the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines,243 outline detailed methodologies for determining the
relative contribution of economic activities in different jurisdictions to
the production of items of income.
The rise of the digital economy has put a great amount of pressure
on the current transfer pricing system, and these difficulties have been

239. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b)(1)(i) (1975).
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c)(1)(ii) (2020) (allocating income from the sale of inventory
property between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions based on the relative value of production assets).
241. See I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (containing an overview of the development
of transfer pricing regulations under § 482 and its predecessors dating back to the 1920s); OECD,
TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1979) (containing initial transfer
pricing guidelines put forward by the OECD in 1979).
242. I.R.C. § 482 and accompanying regulations.
243. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2017), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/tpg-2017-en.pdf?expir
es=1626115140&id=id&accname=ocid177456&checksum [https://perma.cc/4MKS-2S44] (containing
most recent revision of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines that were originally released in 1979).
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documented thoroughly by both academics and practitioners.244 The
centrality of intangible assets, including data, to the digital economy
presents a particularly strong challenge because these assets are often
hard to value.245 However, these weaknesses are ones that the
international tax system must grapple with whether or not digital
laborers are treated in the same way as a workforce when allocating
taxing authority amongst jurisdictions. This is because the Pillar One
Blueprint, as well as other reform proposals, are built on top of the
current transfer pricing system.246
In recognition of the need to strengthen the transfer pricing
system, Actions 8–10 of the OECD/BEPS Project have aimed to
address the current system’s weaknesses and provide guidance on
transfer pricing issues relating to controlled transactions involving
intangibles, contractual allocation of risk, and other difficult-to-value
transactions.247 With respect to intangibles, the guidance requires that
the entity that owns an intangible asset must compensate related
entities that contributed to the value of the intangibles248; this
compensation could potentially include a share of the profits that the
owner entity derives from exploiting the intangibles.249 The guidelines
also allow for the possibility of using financial results following the
transfer of an intangible between related entities to revalue the
intangible’s price on the date of transfer.250 These guidelines should
mitigate some of the weaknesses of the current transfer pricing system
and facilitate more accurate valuation of the relative value added by
digital laborers’ data and content to the creation of an item of income.
Furthermore, because transfer pricing relies on taxing authorities’
ability to determine the arm’s length price for a transaction,251 transfer
244. See, e.g., Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 60, at 90 (outlining the flexibility of transfer
pricing rules in the context of the digital economy); Kleinbard, supra note 56, at 705 (identifying
weaknesses of transfer pricing rules in the context of intangible assets).
245. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 56, at 705; OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 60, at 19–
20 (noting the challenges presented by hard to value assets).
246. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, at 12.
247. OECD, Action 8-10: Transfer Pricing, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/
actions8-10 [https://perma.cc/MUT7-NPAF] (summarizing the recommendations stemming from
Actions 8–10).
248. OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION 78–80
(2015), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241244-en.pdf?expires=1647121619&id=
id&accname=guest&checksum [https://perma.cc/Q92M-K2QG].
249. Id. at 79–80.
250. Id. at 109–12.
251. See id. at 9 (“The arm’s length principle is used by countries as the cornerstone of
transfer pricing rules.”).
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pricing with respect to data will improve in accuracy as the data
economy matures and more comparable transactions, as well as thirdparty valuations, occur.
Additionally, applying the transfer pricing system to allocate
taxing authority over income from digital laborers’ content and data
creation has the advantage over other proposed reforms of continuity.
Taxpayers as well as taxing authorities have decades of experience
applying the transfer pricing system. Shifting to a system based on
residual profit allocation would be administratively burdensome to
taxpayers and taxing authorities alike and would bring with it its own
challenges of determining the relative contribution of different
economic activities to income creation.
Treating digital laborers in the same way as a traditional
workforce when allocating taxing authority over income that is directly
attributable to their content and data creation is a theoretically
coherent and equitable approach to international taxation. It allows
equivalent business activities to be taxed in the same manner.
Although implementation of this reform implicates the difficult task of
accurately measuring the relative contribution of digital laborers to a
company’s income, this task is one that the current international tax
system is already addressing. Because this reform can be accomplished
under the same transfer pricing rules under which companies currently
operate, it provides the advantage of continuity and can be a truly
global reform, not one that only applies to a subset of companies. The
combination of theoretical coherence, administrative viability, and
comprehensiveness makes this reform a promising path forward for
international tax law.
CONCLUSION
The increasing importance of digital laborers across all industries
in the global economy calls for a reevaluation of when and how their
home countries should be able to tax income attributable to their work.
As this Article has demonstrated, digital laborers serve a similar
function as a traditional workforce when producing content and data
for companies. To maintain coherence in the international tax system,
digital laborers should be treated in the same way as a traditional
workforce when allocating taxing authority amongst jurisdictions.
Once digital laborers are treated in the same way as a traditional
workforce, their home countries can be allocated taxing authority over
income directly attributable to their work under the current application
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of the source principle and with more incremental structural changes
to the international tax system than those proposed by competing
reforms.

